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CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-UNITED STATES v. EVANS:

DIS

TRICT OF ARREST OR DISTRICT OF PROSECUTION?-DETERMINING
THE PROPER TRIBUNAL FOR REVIEW OF PRETRIAL BAIL DECI
SIONS IN THE MULTI-DISTRICT CONTEXT

American criminal procedure has its defects, though its essentials
have behind them the vindication of long history. But all systems
of law, however wise, are administered through men and there
fore may occasionally disclose the frailties of men. Perfection
may not be demanded of law, but the capacity to counteract inev
itable, though rare, frailties is the mark of a civilized legal
mechanism. 1
INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Evans,2 the defendant, John Byrnes Evans,
was arrested in Arizona on a warrant issued upon the return of an
indictment arising out of violations of federal law alleged to have
occurred in West Virginia. 3 He was brought before the federal
magistrate judge in Arizona,4 and ordered detained without bail
pending trial. s Evans sought review of his detention in the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona pursuant to the
Bail Reform Act of 1984.6 Section 3145(b) of the Bail Reform Act
authorizes review of the magistrate judge's detention order in fed
eral district court, but fails to specify which district court has the
authority to review the order. 7 The government argued that only
the district court in the charging district possesses that authority.8
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
1. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 310 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
2. 62 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 1995).
3. [d. at 1234.
4. [d. Evans was brought before the magistrate judge in Arizona pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4O(a). [d. See infra note 35 for the pertinent text
of Rule 4O(a).
5. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1234-35.
6. [d. at 1235. See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. I,
§§ 202-210, 98 Stat. 1976-87 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 3141-3150
(1994».
7. See infra note 60 for the pertinent text of § 3145(b).
8. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1235.
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Ninth Circuit agreed.9 The dissent, however, agreed with Evans in
concluding that the district court in the district of his arrest was the
proper tribunal to review the magistrate judge's order of
detention. 10
This Note focuses upon the proper interpretation of sections
3145(a) and (b) of the Bail Reform Act of 198411 by analyzing the
decision of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Evans. Part I pro
vides a brief history of the concept of bail and examines the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 as well as the procedural complexities involved
in federal criminal proceedings in both the single- and multi-district
contexts. Part I also introduces the concept of venue embodied
within the United States Constitution. Part II of this Note discusses
the facts of the principal case, Evans, and traces it through disposi
tion at the district court level to the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Against the backdrop of
the controlling authorities, Part III analyzes the holding of Evans,
with a critique of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
This Part of the Note concludes that the majority correctly deter
mined that the district of prosecution is the proper district to review
the detention order issued by the magistrate judge in the district of
arrest. Finally, Part IV addresses howthe conflict arising in Evans
is properly resolved through this conclusion.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

The History of Bail

The statutory history of bail began with the passage of the Judi
ciary Act of 1789.12 In this Act, Congress provided a right to bail
for defendants accused of non-capital crimes in federal courts.D
9.

Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1239-40 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
11. Subsection (b) of § 3145 authorizes review of an order of detention upon re
quest by the defendant, while subsection (a) authorizes review of a release order upon a
motion by either the government or the defendant. See infra notes 59 and 60 for the
pertinent text of subsections (a) and (b).
12. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789) (current version at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1994».
13. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1,4 (1951) ("From the passage of the Judici
ary Act of 1789 ... federal law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a
non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail."); United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790
F.2d 984,997 (2d Cir. 1986) ("First Judiciary Act ... provided a right to bail in all cases
except capital offenses ...."). See also JoAnn M. Arkfeld, Comment, The Federal Bail
Reform Act of 1984: Effect of the Dangerousness Determination on Pretrial Detention,
19 PAC. L.J. 1435, 1436 (1988) ("Since 1789, Congress has provided a right to bail in
noncapital criminal cases ...."); Heidi J. Herman, Note, United States v. Salerno: The
10.

1996]

DISTRICT OF ARREST OR DISTRICT OF PROSECUTION?

489

However, courts were required to detain defendants who were
viewed as risks of flight, likely to tamper with witnesses or jurors, or
charged with capital crimes. 14 The 1789 Act remained substantially
unchanged until the implementation of the Bail Reform Act of
1966. 15
In the 1966 Act, Congress attempted to address public dissatis
faction with the practice of courts detaining indigent defendants by
imposing artificially high bail requirements.1 6 The 1966 Act re
quired courts to either release defendants on their own recogni
zance or grant defendants conditional release pending trial, unless
the judicial officer determined that release would not adequately
assure the appearance of the defendantP A shortcoming of the
1966 Act was that it did not allow the judicial officer to consider the
future dangerousness of a defendant in making the determination
of whether to grant pretrial release. IS The Act failed to address the
Bail Reform Act is Here to Stay, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 165, 166 (1989) ("The Judiciary
Act guaranteed all persons accused of non-capital crimes the right to be released on
bail. ").
14. The rationale behind the first two exceptions to the admission of a defendant
to bail was that "there will not be a fair trial if the accused is not present or if the jurors
and witnesses have been threatened or bribed." Herman, supra note 13, at 167 n.20. In
capital crimes, defendants were denied bail because they were considered to be extreme
risks of flight. Id. A defendant "released on bail with the knowledge that if he appears
in court, he will face the possibility of a death sentence or life imprisonment, may
reevaluate his options before entering the court room." Id. See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4;
Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1002; United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3, 5 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1326 n.6
(D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
15. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3151 (1982) (repealed 1984».
16. Michael Harwin, Detaining for Danger Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984:
Paradoxes of Procedure and Proof, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 1091, 1093 (1993); Arkfeld, supra
note 13, at 1436. Additionally, this concern was addressed in the passage of the 1984
Bail Reform Act. See, e.g., United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 890 (8th CiT. 1985)
(One of "[t]he major differences between the [1966] Bail Reform Act and the 1984 Act
... [is] the prohibition against using inordinately high financial conditions to detain
defendants. ").
17. Pub. L. No. 89-465,80 Stat. 214 (1966) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c.
§§ 3141-3151 (1982) (repealed 1984». The 1966 Act provided in pertinent part:
Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by
death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released
pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an un
secured appearance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless
the officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such release will
not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required.
18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1982) (repealed 1984).
18. See Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c.
§§ 3145-3151 (1982) (repealed 1984». See also Orta, 760 F.2d at 890.
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growing concern for crimes being committed by dangerous individ
uals awaiting trial.1 9 This increasing problem was one of the major
impetuses behind the Bail Reform Act of 1984.20
The 1984 Act "mark[ed] a significant departure" from the fun
damental philosophy that the concept of bail exists solely to assure
the appearance of the defendant for tria1. 21 It focused upon a con
cern for community safety and the need for preventive detention22
by requiring the judicial officer to consider the dangerousness of
the defendant in making bail determinations.23
The Bail Reform Act specifically governs the process of deter
19.

See Pub. L. No. 89-465. 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c.

§§ 3141-3151 (1982) (repealed 1984)}. See also Harwin, supra note 16, at 1093; Arkfeld,

supra note 13, at 1437.
20. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473. tit. II, ch. I, §§ 202-210, 98 Stat.
1976-87 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U~S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1994}). See, e.g., Orta,
760 F.2d at 890 (the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was "a legislative response to growing
public concern over increased crime and the perceived connection between crime and
defendants released on bail"); United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir.
1985) (1984 revision of the Bail Reform Act responded to the "'alarming problem' of
crimes committed by persons on release"). The Senate Report stated that the revisions
to the 1966 Act incorporated into the 1984 Act "reflect the Committee's determination
that Federal bail laws must address the alarming problem of crimes committed by per
sons on release and must give the courts adequate authority to make release decisions
that give appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if re
leased." S. REp. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182,3185. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 also revised the 1966 Act in order to address
such other problems as:
(a) the need to consider community safety in setting nonfinancial pretrial con
ditions of release, (b) the need to expand the list of statutory release condi
tions, (c) the need to permit the pretrial detention of defendants as to whom
no conditions of release will assure their appearance at trial or assure the
safety of the community or of other persons, (d) the need for a more appropri
ate basis for deciding on post-conviction release, (e) the need to permit tem
porary detention of persons who are arrested while they are on a form of
conditional release ... , and (f) the need to provide procedures for revocation
of release for violation of the conditions of release.
Id. For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of the Bail Reform Acts of 1966
and 1984, see Harwin, supra note 16, at 1092-96; Arkfeld, supra note 13, at 1439-48.
21. S. REp. No. 225, supra note 20, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3185
86.
22. In contrast, the primary focus of the 1966 Act was on the release of defend
ants before trial. Arkfeld, supra note 13, at 1441. See, e.g., Williams, 753 F.2d at 332
("Previously, under the Bail Reform Act of 1966, the exclusive consideration in setting
bail was whether the defendant would appear at trial.") (footnote omitted).
The term "preventive detention" refers to "pretrial incarceration of a defendant if
release would pose a danger to the community or if the defendant would be likely to
commit crime if released pending trial." Arkfeld, supra note 13, at 1441 n.60.
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b} (1994). E.g., Williams, 753 F.2d at 332 (In the 1984
revision to the Bail Reform Act, "federal courts have been accorded the power to
weigh the risk to the community posed by a defendant's release pending trial.").
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mining whether defendants accused of federal crimes should be de
tained or released. The procedures to be followed in reaching the
bail determination stage, however, are prescribed by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
B.

Procedural Complexities

A common situation in criminal cases involving violations of
federal law arises where a defendant is arrested in one district, but
the alleged violations-and subsequent indictment-occur in an
other district, giving rise to a multi-district proceeding.24 This type
of proceeding raises an interesting question for the judiciary: Which
is the proper district court to review a federal magistrate judge's
detention or release order-the district court in the district of arrest
or the district court in the charging district? This issue does not
surface in a single-district proceeding because the alleged offenses
have occurred in the same district as the arrest. 25 In a multi-district
proceeding, however, the procedure is somewhat different, and de
termining which district court has the authority to review the magis
trate's order is slightly more complex.
1.

Single-District Proceeding Under Rules 5 and 5.1 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Rules 5 and 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure set
out the requirements and procedure to follow in the situation where
a defendant is arrested in the same district where the alleged of
fenses occurred. 26 Rule 5 requires an "initial appearance" of the
defendant "without unnecessary delay before the nearest available
federal magistrate judge. "27 At the initial appearance, the magis
trate judge must inform the defendant of the complaint against him
and of his general rightS. 28 Additionally, the magistrate judge is re
24. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factual
situation which gives rise to the multi-district proceeding as in United States v. Evans.
25. It is clear that in the single-district proceeding the entire process-from the
moment of indictment to final disposition of the case-takes place in a single district.
No other district has any interest in the matter.
26. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5, 5.1. For a thorough discussion of the requirements and
procedures under Rules 5 and 5.1, see generally David J. Charies, Preliminary Hear
ings, 81 OEO. L.J. 1094 (1993).
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). The "initial appearance" is "[t]he first court appear
ance for a defendant charged with a federal offense." JOHN L. WEINBERG, FEDERAL
BAIL AND DETENTION HANDBOOK § 3.01, at 3-1 (1992).
28. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c). The defendant's general rights include, inter alia, the
right to counselor to request assignment of counsel, and the right to remain silent. Id.
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quired to "det~in or conditionally release the defendant as provided
by statute."29 The magistrate judge must also, under Rule 5, inform
the defendant that he is entitled to a "preliminary examination."30
In the event that the defendant is arrested without a warrant, the
magistrate judge must make a finding of probable cause in compli
ance with Federal Rule 4(a).31
Federal Rule 5.1 addresses the "preliminary examination" re
ferred to in Rule 5. Rule 5.1 expands upon the Rule 5 probable
cause requirement. 32 Under Rule 5.1, if the magistrate judge finds
that "there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the defendant committed it," the magistrate
judge must "hold the defendant to answer in district court. "33 How
ever, if no probable cause is found, the magistrate judge must dis
miss the complaint and release the defendant. 34
2.

Multi-District Proceeding Under Rule 40 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure

The starting point in a multi-district proceeding is set forth in
Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the multi
district situation, Rule 4O(a) requires the defendant to be taken
Rule 5(c) also addresses the time frame in which a defendant must receive a prelimi
nary examination. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The defendant has the right to waive the preliminary examination. If the
defendant waives the preliminary examination, the magistrate judge must hold the de
fendant to answer in federal district court. If the defendant does not waive the prelimi
nary examination, the magistrate judge is required to schedule one. Id.
The initial appearance and preliminary examination constitute two separate pro
ceedings. The preliminary examination can be held at the same time as the initial ap
pearance, but "in practice this ordinarily does not occur." FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 advisory
committee's note. -"Usually counsel need time to prepare for the preliminary examina
tion and as a consequence a separate date is typically set for the preliminary examina
tion." Id.
.
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1. Rule 4(a) states that
"[i]f it appears from the complaint ... that there is probable cause to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, a warrant for the
arrest of the defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute it." FED.
R. CRIM. P. 4(a).
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a). See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975) (hold
ing that the Fourth Amendment requires "a timely judicial determination of probable
cause as a prerequisite to detention").
33. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a).
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(b). Preliminary examination is unnecessary in two situa
tions. The first is where the defendant has been indicted or an information has been
filed in federal district court. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c). The second is where the defendant
elects to waive the preliminary examination. Id.
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"without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal
magistrate judge," which is the magistrate judge in the district of
arrest. 35 The preliminary proceedings under Rule 40 are required
to be conducted in accordance with Rules 5 and 5.1. 36 Conse
quently, the defendant is entitled to an "initial appearance" as well
as a "preliminary examination" before the magistrate judge in the
district of arrest. 37 However, Rule 40(a) allows the defendant to
elect to have the preliminary examination conducted in the charg
ing district. 38 Additionally, Rule 4O(a) ·provides that if the defend
ant is held to answer for the offense committed, the defendant must
answer in the district in which prosecution is pending. 39
Rule 40(b) requires the magistrate judge to inform the defend
ant of the provisions of Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedtire. 40 Rule 20 grants the defendant the right to waive trial
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). Rule 4O(a) provides:
If a person is arrested in a district other than that in which the offense is al
leged to have been committed, that person must be taken without unnecessary
delay before the nearest available federal magistrate judge. . . . If held to
answer, the defendant must be held to answer in the district court in which the
prosecution is pending-provided that a warrant is issued in that district ....
Id. E.g., Parman v. United States, 399 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that one arrested in
a district distant from that of the commission of the offense must be presented before a
magistrate in the district of arrest), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 858 (1968).
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the requirements and procedures under Rules 5 and 5.1. In analyzing the
language of, and purposes behind, Rule 4O(a), it is important to be aware of the rele
vance of Federal Rules 5 and 5.1. Cases that have addressed Rules 5 and 5.1 have
determined that custody and control of the defendant must be relinquished, without
unnecessary delay after arrest, to the magistrate judge whose function is to advise the
defendant of his rights and to conduct a hearing as soon as possible to determine
whether there is sufficient probable cause to warrant further detention. See, e.g., Ricks
V. United States, 334 F.2d 964, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The Notes of the Advisory Com
mittee on Rules for the 1979 amendment to Rule 40 state that "[u]nder rule 5.1 dealing
with the preliminary examination, the defendant is to be held to answer only upon
showing of probable cause that an offense has been committed and that the defendant
committed it." FED. R. CRIM. P. 40 advisory committee's note (emphasis added). The
rule that the defendant must be taken before the nearest available magistrate judge is
invoked for the protection of a defendant who may be prejudiced by a delay. See gener
ally United States V. Bandy, 421 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1970); United States V. Asher, 367 F.
Supp.895 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
37. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5,5.1.
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a).
39. Id. E.g., United States V. Perkins, 433 F.2dl182, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Rule
40 specifies the procedures governing transfer of an arrestee from the district of his
arrest to another district wherein the trial is properly to be held."). See also FED. R.
CRIM. P. 40 advisory committee's note.
40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(b). Rule 4O(b) provides: "In addition to the statements
required by Rule 5, the federal magistrate judge shall inform the defendant of the pro
visions of Rule 20." Id. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 20.
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in the district of prosecution and allow the district of arrest to hear
the case.41 The waiver, however, is subject to approval by the
United States attorney for each district. 42
Federal Rule 40(c) requires documentation generated by the
preliminary examination and any bail collected to be transmitted to
the district court in the district of prosecution.43 The transmission is
to be made upon determination of detention or discharge of the
defendant pursuant to the Bail Reform Act. 44
Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide the
general procedure to follow in single- and multi-district proceed
ings, they provide no guidance in initiating a hearing to determine
whether pretrial detention of the defendant is appropriate. 45 More
over, the Rules render no insight into what occurs at the detention
hearing, or what happens in the event any of the parties contest the
findings of the magistrate judge.46 The Bail Reform Act of 1984
addresses these concerns.
3. The Bail Reform Act of 198447
Section 3141 of the Bail Reform Act authorizes the judicial of
ficer, before whom the defendant is brought, to order such person
released or detained. 48 Section 3142 of the Act requires a determi
41. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20. Rule 20(a) provides in pertinent part:
A defendant arrested ... in a district other than that in which an indictment or
information is pending ... may state in writing a wish ... to waive trial in the
district in which the indictment or information is pending, and to consent to
disposition of the case in the district in which that defendant was arrested, ...
subject to the approval of the United States attorney for each district.
Id.
42. Id.
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(c).
44. Id.
45. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 5,5.1,40.
46. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 5,5.1,40.
47. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 1, §§ 202-210, 98 Stat.
1976 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 3141-3151 (1994».
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3141(a) (1994). Any judicial officer who is authorized to order
the arrest of a person under 18 U.S.c. § 3041 (1994) may conduct the hearing to deter
mine whether the defendant should be detained or released. § 3141. "[T]hese 'judicial
officers' can include Justices or judges of the United States, magistrates, and other
court-appointed officials, and a variety of state court judges." Michael Edmund
O'Neill, A Two-Pronged Standard of Appellate Review for Pretrial Bail Determinations,
99 YALE L.J. 885, 889 n.39 (1990). Magistrate judges are empowered by the Federal
Magistrates Act to "issue orders pursuant to section 3142 [of the Bail Reform Act] ...
concerning release or detention" of defendants prior to trial. 28 U.S.c. § 636(a)(2)
(1994). See Harwin, supra note 16, at 1096 n.36; O'Neill, supra, at 889. Thus, the mag
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nation of release or detention of the defendant pending tria1. 49
Under section 3142, the magistrate judge must conduct a detention
hearing upon motion of the prosecution or, in certain circum
stances, upon motion of the magistrate judge herself. 50 The deten
tion hearing is to be held "immediately upon the person's first
appearance before the judicial officer" unless a continuance is
sought by either the defendant or the government. 51
istrate judge often makes the initial bail decision. Harwin, supra note 16, at 1096;
O'Neill, supra, at 889.
49. 18 U.S.c. § 3142 (1994).
50. § 3142(f)(1), (2). Section 3142(f) provides:
The judicial officer shall hold a hearing to detennine whether any condition or
combination of conditions set forth in subsection (c) of this section will reason
ably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any
other person and the community
(1) upon motion of the attorney for the Government, in a case that in
volves
(A) a crime of violence;
(B) an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment
or death;
(C) an offense for which a maximum tenn of imprisonment of ten
years or more is prescribed [in certain Acts] ... ; or
(D) any felony if such person has been convicted of two or more of
fenses ... ; or
(2) upon motion of the attorney for the Government or upon the judicial
officer's own motion in a case, that involves
(A) a serious risk that such person will flee; or
(B) a serious risk that such person will obstruct . . . justice, or
threaten, injure, or intimidate ... a prospective witness or juror.
§ 3142(f).
51. § 3142(f). "In practice, the defendant makes an 'initial appearance' before
the magistrate" judge. Harwin, supra note 16, at 1096-97; O'Neill, supra note 48, at 889.
The "initial appearance" is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5. At this
appearance, the government can move for a detention hearing pursuant to § 3142(f)(I).
Harwin, supra note 16, at 1097. The Bail Refonn Act authorizes the magistrate judge
to conduct a detention hearing at the defendant's initial appearance. O'Neill, supra
note 48, at 889. With this in mind, there are basically five dispositions at which the
courts can arrive regarding detention or release:
1. Order "temporary detention." If the case is one that qualifies for tempo
rary detention under the statute, the court must so order. See § 3142(d) ... .
2. Conduct a "detention hearing" immediately. See § 3142(e) and (f) ... .
3. Continue the case three to five days upon a motion for detention hearing,
while defendant remains in custody. See § 3142(f) ....
4. Order defendant's release on his personal recognizance bond or an un
secured appearance bond. See § 3142(b) ....
5. Set other conditions for release. See § 3142(c) ....
WEINBERG, supra note 27, § 3.03 at 3-2. "As a routine matter ... magistrates grant
short continuances, thereby giving the parties time to prepare for the actual detention
. hearing." O'Neill, supra note 48, at 889 (footnotes omitted). As a result, the detention
hearing is nonnally conducted at the "preliminary examination" proceeding before the
magistrate judge, which is governed by Federal Rule 5.1.
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Section 3142 of the Act also sets out the details of the "release
or detention" requirement. 52 Subsections (b) and (c) provide two
possibilities for the defendant's release: (1) on personal recogni
zance or unsecured appearance bond,53 or (2) on certain conditions
if deemed necessary by the judicial officer. 54 Under subsection
3142(e), the magistrate judge must detain the defendant if there are
no conditions that will reasonably assure the appearance of the de
fendant or protect the safety of the community.55
Subsection 3142(g) of the Bail Reform Act guides the magis
trate judge in determining whether to release or detain a defendant
by specifying the factors to be considered at the detention hear
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1994).
53. § 3142(b). Section 3142(b) provides in pertinent part:
The judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of the person on personal
recognizance. or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an
amount specified by the court, subject to the condition that the person not
commit a ... crime during the period of release, unless the judicial officer
determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the
person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the
community.
Id. Release on "personal recognizance" means:
Pre-trial release based on the person's own promise that he will show up for
trial (no bond required). A species of bail in which the defendant acknowl
edges personally without sureties his obligation to appear in court at the next
hearing or trial date of his case. It is used in place of a bail bond when the
judge or magistrate is satisfied that the'defendant will appear without the need
of a surety bond or other form of security.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1290 (6th ed. 1990). An "unsecured appearance bond" is
"[a] bail bond for which the defendant is fully liable upon failure to appear in court
when ordered to do so or upon breach of a material condition of release, but which is
not secured by any deposit or lien upon property." Id. at 140.
54. § 3142(c). If the magistrate judge determines that release of the defendant
under subsection (b) will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant or will
pose a threat to the safety of other people or the community, the magistrate judge may
order release of the defendant subject to certain conditions. §.3142(c)(I). The first
uniform condition is that "the person not commit a Federal, State, or local crime during
the period of release." § 3142(c)(I)(A). Furthermore, numerous other conditions, or
combinations of conditions, may be employed by the magistrate judge to reasonably
assure the appearance of the defendant and the safety of the community.
§ 3142(c)(I)(B). For instance, the magistrate judge may impose the conditions that the
defendant: remain in the custody of a designated person; maintain employment or ac
tively seek employment; maintain an education; avoid contact with the alleged victim of
the crime; comply with a curfew; and so on. See § 3142(c)(I)(B)(i)-(xiv). The list of
conditions provided in § 3142(c) that the magistrate judge may impose on the defend
ant is not exhaustive .. Any combination of conditions may be set by the magistrate
judge, so long as the conditions are determined to "reasonably assure the appearance of
the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community."
§ 3142(c)(I)(B).
55. § 3142(e).
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ing. 56 The magistrate judge utilizes a balance of those factors to
determine whether release of the defendant will assure the defend
ant's appearance and protect the community.57
After the detention hearing is conducted, and an order issued,
the result is often disputed by either the government or the defend
ant. 58 In such a circumstance, section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act
allows for review of the release59 or detention order. 60 A motion
for review must be filed with the "court having original jurisdiction
over the offense"-the United States federal district court. 61 Sec
56. § 3142(g). The factors that the magistrate judge may consider in making the
determination of detention or release include:
(I) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged ... ;
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including
(A) the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, em
ployment, financial resources, length of residence in the community,
community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol
abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court
proceedings; and
(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was
on probation, on parole, or on other release ... ; and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community
that would be posed by the person's release.
Id.
57. Id. If the information obtained reveals that there will be no reasonable assur
ance of the appearance of the defendant or of the safety of others or the community,
the defendant shall be ordered detained under subsection (e). § 3142(e).
58. See United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1995). See infra
notes 85-91 and accompanying text for the facts of Evans. In Evans, the defendant
disputed the detention order issued by the magistrate judge and sought review pursuant
to § 3145(b) of the Bail Reform Act. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1235. See infra note 60 for the
pertinent text of § 3145(b). If the government had disputed a release order, review
would have presumably been brought pursuant to § 3145(a). See infra note 59 for the
pertinent text of § 3145(a).
59. § 3145(a). Section 3145(a) provides:
If a person is ordered released by a magistrate ... 
(I) the attorney for the Government may file, with the court having origi
nal jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation of the order or
amendment of the conditions of release; and
(2) the person may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over
the offense, a motion for amendment of the conditions of release.
The motion shall be determined promptly.
Id.
60. § 3145(b). Section 3145(b) states: "If a person is ordered detained by a magis
trate, ... the person may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over the of
fense, a motion for revocation or amendment of the order. The motion shall be
determined promptly." Id.
61. § 3145(a), (b). See WEINBERG, supra note 27, § 9.02(a) at 9-2 (The language
of section 3145 referring to "the court having original jurisdiction" must "certainly
mean[] review by a district judge. ").
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tion 3145 mandates that the motion for review "shall be determined
promptly."62
Although section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act does not specify
the standard of review to be followed by the district court, the
United States courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have
uniformly determined that the district court judge should conduct
de novo review. 63 The decision to conduct de novo review, how
ever, is at the district court's discretion. 64 Furthermore, exactly
what is involved in de novo detention or release order review is not
specified by the courts of appeals. 65 There are almost as many vari
ations on the de novo standard as there are courts that have de
cided the issue. 66
Section 3145 also allows either party to appeal from the district
court's determination of detention or release, or from the district
court's decision to deny revocation or amendment of an existing
order.67 The section allows appeal to be brought before the appro
priate United States court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and 18 U.S.C. § 3731. 68
62. § 3145.
63. WEINBERG, supra note 27, § 9.02(c) at 9-4. See also O'Neill, supra note 48, at
891 n.60; Bruce D. Pringle, Bail and Detention in Federal Criminal Proceedings, 22
CoLO. LAW. 913, 922 (1993); Sally Baumler, Note, Appellate Review Under the Bail
Reform Act, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 483, 503.
"De novo review involves no deference to the lower court. The' [reviewing] court
redetennines the issue as though being presented with it for the first time." Baumler,
supra, at 503 n.213.
64. O'Neill, supra note 48, at 891 n.56. See, e.g., United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d
1390,1394-95 (3d Cir. 1985) (district court could detennine whether to conduct de novo
review).
65. O'Neill, supra note 48, at 891 n.60.
66. See United States v. Torres, 929 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1991) (district judge
may review transcript of magistrate hearing; in the alternative, district judge can "start
from scratch," but must follow same procedure as magistrate); United States v. Koenig,
912 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1990) (district judge should review evidence that was
before magistrate judge and make independent detennination whether magistrate's
findings are correct; district judge may hold additional evidentiary hearings); United
States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1481-82 (8th Cir. 1985) (de novo review with all possible
options available to the magistrate); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 249 (5th Cir.
1985) (district judge acts de novo, and review could be an independent detennination,
or based on evidence presented to magistrate judge and additional evidence obtained
by district judge); United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1985) (district court
should reach "own independent conclusion"); Delker, 757 F.2d at 1394 (standard of
review is de novo and within discretion of district judge whether to conduct own eviden
tiary hearing).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (1994).
68. § 3145(c). Section 3145(c) provides: "An appeal from a release or detention
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Constitutional Requirements of Venue: Article III, Section 2,
Clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment

In a multi-district proceeding, the issue of where the defendant
can constitutionally be prosecuted is pertinent in ascertaining which
district court has "original jurisdiction over the offense" for pur
poses of pretrial bail decision review. 69 In federal criminal prosecu
tions, proper venue lies solely in the "district in which the offense
was committed."70 This rule derives from the constitutional guar
antee of trial "in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed" under Article III, Section 2, Clause 3,71 and the Sixth
Amendment right to "an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed."72 One of the justifi
cations behind the constitutional guarantees of venue in the state or
order, or from a decision denying revocation or amendment of such an order, is gov
erned by the provisions of section 1291 of title 28 and section 3731 of this title." Id.
Section 1291 of title 28 and § 3731 of title 18 of the United States Code provide
that an appeal from a decision of a district court shall lie to the court of appeals and that
the court of appeals shall have jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1994).
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b) (1994).
70. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. Rule 18 provides:
Except as otherwise permitted ... , the prosecution shall be had in a district in
which the offense was committed. The court shall fix the place of trial within
the district with due regard to the convenience of the defendant and the wit
nesses and the prompt administration of justice.
Id.
71. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. See, e.g., Hanson v. United States. 285 F.2d 27,
28 (9th Cir. 1960) ("The Constitution of the United States grants an accused the right to
a trial within the state and federal district in which his offense was committed.").
72. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. Strictly speaking, the requirement provided in Arti
cle III, Section 2, Clause 3 is a venue requirement while the requirement set out in the
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution is considered a "vicinage" requirement. The
Sixth Amendment is commonly called the "vicinage" requirement because it "specifies
the geographic area from which jurors in criminal proceedings must be drawn" and
"does not, as is often mistakenly assumed, establish the venue in which the proceedings
themselves must take place." Wm. Henry Jernigan, Jr., Note, The Sixth Amendment
and the Right to a Trial by a Jury ofthe Vicinage, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 399, 399-400
(1974); Scott Kafker, Comment, The Right to Venue and the Right to an Impartial Jury:
Resolving the Conflict in the Federal Constitution, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 729, 729 n.2
(1985). See Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 314 n.2 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1083 (1981); United States v. Countryside Farms, Inc., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) <j[
61,629 (D. Utah Jan. 28,1977). However, the distinction has been referred to as "unim
portant." Id. at 72,604. See 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE
DURE: CRIMINAL 20 § 301, at 190 (2d ed. 1982). "In practice, the sixth amendment has
consistently been interpreted as guaranteeing trial in the district where the crime was
committed." Note, Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts: The Obstruction of Justice
Puzzle,82 MICH. L. REv. 90,90 n.3 (1983). See, e.g., Johnston v. United States, 351
U.S. 215, 220 (1956); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 232-33 (1924).
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district where the crime was committed was to "facilitat[e] factfind
ing by holding trial near where the relevant evidence could be
found. "73 In addition, the venue provisions avoid prejudice to an
accused's case that might result from facing trial in a district where
it would be difficult to obtain witnesses in preparation for trial.74
Because the right to trial where the crime was committed is a right
guaranteed by the Constitution, only the defendant may waive the
right and move for a change of venue.75
73. Note, supra note 72, at 107-08. See Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 640
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("basic policy" of venue best served by trial where the
"witnesses and relevant circumstances surrounding the contested issues" will be found);
United States v. DiJames, 731 F.2d 758, 762 (11th Cir. 1984) (One of the policy reasons
for the venue provisions is that the jurors "know the local conditions surrounding the
criminal acts," thus they are able to "draw the most accurate inferences from the evi
dence presented at trial."); United States v. Nadolny, 601 F.2d 940, 943 (7th CiT. 1979)
("Venue traditionally has been based on notions of fair, fast and efficient administration
of trials. When venue is laid in the proper district-the one in which the crime was
committed-witnesses are more readily available, and the operative facts and situs of
the incident are closer at hand."), overruled by U.S. v. Fredrick, 835 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.
1987).
The constitutional venue provisions arose out of the common law, which required
criminal prosecutions to be sought in the county where the crime was committed. See
Note, supra note 72, at 105; 1 J. BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 49 (2d ed.
1913). The purpose behind this common-law rule was:
[So] that the circumstances of [the] crime may be more clearly examined, and
that the knowledge which the jurors thereby receive of [the] general character
[of the defendant], and of the credibility of the witnesses, might assist them in
pronouncing, with a greater degree of certainty, upon [the defendant's] inno
cence or guilt.
16 PARL. HIST. ENG. 490 (1769). In essence, the common-law justification for venue
was that it provided "[b]etter factfinding." Note, supra note 72, at 106. Federal consti
tutional venue provisions were promulgated with the same emphasis in mind. Id. at
107. For a thorough treatment of the history behind the federal constitutional venue
provisions, see Kafker, supra note 72, at 741-50; Note, supra note 72, at 105-0B.
74. DUames, 731 F.2d at 762. The court in DUames also articulated a third policy
reason behind the venue provisions: "[S]ince most crimes usually take place in the dis
trict where the defendant resides, the venue provisions try to reduce the difficulties to
the defendant that would be caused by a trial at a distance from his home and friends."
Id. But cf Note, supra note 72, at 107 n.89 ("[T]he desire to spare the accused the
rigors of trial far from home is no longer a compelling justification.... [T]he district-of
the-crime test will not even serve this policy goal in many cases, since people today are
far more likely to commit crimes outside their district of residence than they once
were.").
75. Donna A. Balaguer, Venue, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1259, 1260 (1993). See,
e.g., DUames, 731 F.2d at 761 ("[a] defendant cannot be forced to accept a change of
venue against his will"); United States v. Abbott Lab., 505 F.2d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 1974)
(change of venue cannot be ordered against defendant's will), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990
(1975); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 116 (1st Cir. 1952) (a defendant "is not
obliged to forgo his constitutional right to an impartial trial in the district wherein the
offense is alleged to have been committed"). But cf Kafker, supra note 72, at 746
(suggesting that the Sixth Amendment right to venue is not an absolute right of the
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Federal statutes that define crimes often contain provisions
that indicate where the proper venue for prosecution liesJ6 In the
absence of a provision by Congress specifying the proper venue,
courts look to where the crime was "committed" as required by the
Constitution. 77 This involves, at a basic level, an analysis of the na
ture of the alleged offense and the location of the acts constituting
the offense to determine where the prosecution should be sought. 78
The concept of venue is separate and distinct from the concept
of jurisdictionJ9 However, courts occasionally "speak in terms of
jurisdiction when they mean venue," which can cause confusion. 80
"Jurisdiction" refers to the inherent power of a court to decide a
case,81 whereas "venue" specifies the particular geographic area in
which a court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case.82
As such, venue may be waived by the defendant, but jurisdiction
may not.83
defendant); United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting the
district court's judicial convenience exception to the defendant's right to venue, but
leaving open the possibility that the defendant's right to venue is not absolute).
76. Balaguer, supra note 75, at 1263. Although Congress can provide venue pro
visions in federal statutes, it "has no authority to establish in a criminal statute venue
which would not be permitted under the Constitution." [d. at 1261.
77. Id. at 1263. See, e.g., Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220 (1956)
("place [of the crime] is determined by the acts of the accused that violate a statute");
United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1188 (2d Cir.) ("When a
crime consists of a single noncontinuing act, it is 'committed' in the district where the
act is performed."), cert. denied sub nom. Lavery v. United States, 493 U.S. 933 (1989).
78. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 635 (1961); United States v. Anderson,
328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946); United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982); United States v. Tedesco, 635 F.2d 902,905 (1st Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); United States v. O'Donnell, 510 F.2d 1190, 1192-93
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
Some courts have adopted a more elaborate test to ascertain where the offense was
committed, called the "substantial contacts rule." Beech-Nut Nutrition, 871 F.2d at
1188-89; United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 481 (2d Cir. 1985). The "substantial con
tacts rule" examines "the site of the defendant's acts, the elements and nature of the
crime, the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct, and the suitability of each district
for accurate fact finding." Beech-Nut Nutrition, 871 F.2d at 1188-89. See also Reed, 773
F.2d at 481.
79. United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 537 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 942 (1981).
80. Id.
81. BLACK'S LAW DICfIONARY 853, 1557 (6th ed. 1990). See Hagans v. Lavine,
415 U.S. 528,538 (1974) Gurisdiction is the authority conferred by Congress to decide a
case); Roberts, 618 F.2d at 537 ("subject matter jurisdiction ... refers to the types of
cases a court is authorized to hear").
82. BLACK'S LAW DICflONARY 1557 (6th ed. 1990).
83. E.g., Roberts, 618 F.2d at 537 (Subject matter jurisdiction is not transferable.
On the other hand, "[a] criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried in the
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UNITED STATES V. EVANs84

Case Facts

In March of 1994, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia issued a warrant for the arrest of
John Byrnes Evans upon the return of an indictment charging Ev
ans with numerous violations of federallaw. 85 Evans was arrested
in Arizona, his state of residence, and brought before a federal
magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the District
of Arizona pursuant to Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 86
At Evans's "initial appearance"87 before the Arizona federal
magistrate judge, the government moved for a pretrial detention
hearing. 88 The magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and
continued the matter to allow time for the United States attorney
for the District of West Virginia to respond to Evans's proposed
bond. 89 In a subsequent hearing, the magistrate judge determined
that Evans should not be released on bond and ordered him de
tained pending tria1. 9o Evans sought review of the magistrate
judge's order in the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona pursuant to 18 U.S.c. § 3145(b).91
B. Disposition of the United States District Court for the District
of Arizona
On Evans's motion for review, the government moved to have
the appeal dismissed, arguing that the Arizona district court did not
have jurisdiction to review the detention order under section 3145
jurisdiction where the crime was committed. This 'constitutional venue' right ... can be
waived."). See also Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68
(1939) (discussing the differences between jurisdiction and venue in a civil context).
84. 62 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 1995).
85. Id. at 1234. The violations that Evans was charged with included: "conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, conspiracy
to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.c. § 1956, and travel to promote marijuana
business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)." Id.
86. Id. See supra note 35 for the text of Rule 40(a).
87. See supra notes 26-34 and 36 and accompanying text discussing the "initial
appearance" and Federal Rule 5, and how they relate to Federal Rule 40.
88. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1234. The motion for a pretrial detention hearing was pre
sumably brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). See supra note 50 for the text of
§ 3142(f).
89. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1234.
90. Id. at 1234-35.
91. Id. at 1235. See supra note 60 for the text of § 3145(b).
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of the Bail Reform Act.92 The government asserted that jurisdic
tion remained solely with the West Virginia district court, which is
sued the warrant, as "the court having original jurisdiction over the
offense" under section 3145.93
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the Arizona district
court determined that it had jurisdiction to review the detention
order, and ordered Evans released on a $100,000 bond.94 The gov
ernment appealed the release order to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 95 In addition, the government re
quested an emergency stay of the district court's release order. 96
The Ninth Circuit stayed the release order pending resolution of
the matter. 97
C.

Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit
1.

Judge Hug's Majority Opinion

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit vacated the Arizona district court's order of release. 98
The Ninth Circuit accepted the government's argument that the
proper district court to review the magistrate judge's detention or
der was the district court in the district of prosecution. 99 Judge Hug
began the court's opinion by discussing the general procedure to
follow when an arrest is made in one district for a federal offense
alleged to have occurred in another district. Ioo
The opinion then addressed the defendant's assertion that sec
tion 3145 of the Bail Reform Act affords the district court in the
district of arrest jurisdiction to review the detention order. 10I Ev
ans argued that 18 U.S.c. § 3231 grants all federal district courts
"original jurisdiction" over federal offenses. I02 The majority ac
Evans, 62 F.3d at 1235.
Id.
Id.
Id. The government appealed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c). See supra
note 68 for the text of § 3145(c).
96. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1235.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1238.
99. Id. at 1237.
100. Id. at 1235. See supra notes 35-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the general procedure for the issuance of the detention or release order in the multi
district ~ontext and review.
10l. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1235-37.
102. Id. at 1235-36. Section 3231 of title 18 of the United States Code reads: "The
92.

93.
94.
95.

504

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:487

knowledged that this section confers a "broad grant of jurisdic
tion."103 However, Judge Hug interpreted section 3231 as merely
providing that "the federal courts, not the state courts, have juris
diction over federal law offenses. "104 The judge determined that
the phrase "the court having original jurisdiction over the offense,"
as used in section 3145, has a much narrower meaning when con
strued in light of the constitutional restrictions on where a defend
ant can be tried. l05
The majority pointed out that Article III, Section 2, Clause 3
and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution establish that, unless
prosecution is "originally" brought in a district permitted by these
provisions and the governing statute, the prosecution is subject to
dismissal by the defendant. l06 Thus, according to the majority, this
matter is really one of venue, rather than jurisdiction, because the
constitutional right to venue can be waived by the defendant. 107
However, the matter can be thought of as jurisdictional in that the
constitutional standard is required until the defendant waives the
right. lOB
The Ninth Circuit majority then analyzed the meaning of the
phrase "the court having original jurisdiction over the offense" con
tained in sections 3145(a) and (b) of the Bail Reform Act in light of
the constitutional, statutory and rule provisions. lo9 The majority fo
cused on the use of the word "the" in the phrase and determined
district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States." 18 U.S.c.
§ 3231 (1994).
103. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236.
104. Id.
105. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See supra
notes 71 and 72 and accompanying text for the pertinent language of both constitutional
provisions, respectively.
106. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236.
107. Id. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text discussing the distinction
between venue and jurisdiction.
108. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236. Judge Hug stated that: "In a sense, this can be
thought of as jurisdictional, in that the constitutional requirement as to the place of trial
must be upheld unless it is waived by the defendant. However, it is more correctly
designated as a venue requirement because it can be waived." Id. Some early cases
construed this matter as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction rather than venue. See,
e.g., United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1916) (addressing the issue of
whether the Court had "jurisdiction of the subject-matter" as a right guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment); Meltzer v. United States, 188 F.2d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 1951) (holding
that a defendant can constitutionally be tried only in the district with "[j]urisdiction of
the subject matter").
109. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236. Specifically, the provisions utilized by the majority
in the analysis included: Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment to
o
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that it refers to a particular district court having original jurisdiction
over the offense. llo On a plain reading of the statute, the court
reasoned that Congress would not have used the word "the" if it
meant "any" court with original jurisdiction. l11 The majority con
cluded that "[b]ecause a prosecution must originally be brought in a
district required by the constitutional and statutory provisions or .
face dismissal, absent a waiver by the defendant, the phrase is most
reasonably interpreted as designating the district in which the pros
ecution is pending," not, as the defendant contended, the district of
arrest. I 12
Finally, the court urged that it would be "a strange and un
wieldy construction" to view the statute as permitting review in any
district court.113 The majority asserted that Rule 40 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and section 3145 of the Bail Reform
Act contemplate review in the district where prosecution is pending
to avoid any delay by an intermediate determination of bail status
in the district of arrest. 1l4 The majority stated that the district of
prosecution is "where the bail status of the defendant ultimately
will be determined during the course of [the] trial."115
The court found support for its position in Rule 4O(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1l6 Rule 40( c) provides that
"all papers in the proceeding before the magistrate judge and any
bail taken is to be transmitted to the clerk of the district court in
which the prosecution is pending."1l7 The majority concluded that
it would be unusual to require the papers and bail to be transmitted
to the district where prosecution is pending if the district of arrest is
to review the magistrate judge's order. lls
2. Chief Judge Wallace's Concurring Opinion119
Chief Judge Wallace began his concurrence by noting that this
the Constitution; 18 U.S.c. §§ 3145 and 3231; and Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Crim
inal Procedure.
110. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1236-37.
113. Id. at 1237.
114. Id. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 40; 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (1994).
115. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1237.
116. Id. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(c).
117. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1237.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1238 (Wallace, C.l., concurring).
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issue was one of first impression,12O Like the majority, the concur
rence acknowledged that section 3145 was more specific than the
broad grant of jurisdiction under section 3231. 121 The concurrence
also recognized that the use of the word "the" in the statute was
important in determining the issue. l22
Chief Judge Wallace relied on Rule 40 for guidance in deter
mining which court was "the" appropriate tribunal to review the
magistrate judge's order,123 The concurrence noted that Rule 40(a)
requires a defendant, who is arrested in a district other than that in
which the alleged offense was committed, to be brought before the
nearest available magistrate judge. l24 Additionally, upon conclu
sion of the preliminary proceedings. Rule 4O(c) requires the papers
and bail pertaining to the defendant to be transferred to "the dis
trict court in which the prosecution is pending."125 Thus, according
to the concurrence, Rule 40 reveals that "the magistrate judge's
role is limited, and that the district court where the prosecution is
pending should take over the case as soon as possible."126
Moreover, the concurrence noted that Rule 40(a) grants the
defendant the right to elect to have preliminary proceedings con
ducted in the district where the prosecution is pending.127 Chief
Judge Wallace urged that this fact further illustrates the limited na
ture of the magistrate's role.1 28 The right of election, the concur
rence asserted, reveals that the purpose for holding the preliminary
examination before the nearest magistrate judge is to ensure
prompt review of a defendant's detention. 129
The concurrence utilized section 3142(g) of the Bail Reform
Act to bolster the position that the proper district to review the
magistrate judge's order is the district of prosecution. 130 Section
3142(g) requires that in determining detention or release, the mag
120.
121.
122.

Id.
[d.
[d. Chief Judge Wallace concluded that "[t]he word 'the' is important. Fail

ure to· pay attention to it would allow any district court in the country to review the
order of a magistrate judge with respect to a bail hearing. That, I suggest, makes no
sense." Id.
123.
124.

[d.

125.

Id. See supra note 35 for the pertinent text of Rule 40(a).
Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wallace, C.J., concurring).

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a).
Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wallace, C.J., concurring).
[d.
[d. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1994).

[d.
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istrate judge must have a certain level of familiarity with the case. 131
The concurrence reasoned that the district in which the prosecution
is pending is the proper district to review the magistrate judge's or
der because it will have the requisite familiarity with the matter. 132
Finally, Chief Judge Wallace noted that the district court in the
district of arrest could review the order of the magistrate judge, but
only in a very limited situation. 133 In a circumstance where the de
fendant has waived trial in the district of prosecution, and where
the waiver is approved by the United States attorney for both dis
tricts, review would be appropriate in the district of arrest. l34
3. Judge Noonan's Dissenting Opinion135

In dissent, Judge Noonan first noted that section 3145 identifies
a court that is "distinctly different" from the court identified by
Federal Rule 40. 136 The dissent stated that the language "the court
having original jurisdiction" as used in section 3145 could mean any
district court of the United States under section 3231.137 However,
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution limits the commence
ment of prosecution to "the district wherein the crime shall have
been committed."138 Thus, according to the dissent, section 3145
refers to a specific district court with jurisdiction over the defend
ant, but the challenge is determining which court that is.139
The dissent determined that the court with jurisdiction over the
131. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wallace, C.J., concurring). See supra note 56 for the
pertinent text of 18 U.S.c. § 3142(g).
132. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wallace, c.J., concurring). The concurring opinion
cited to two cases-without discussion or elaboration-in support of its conclusion. Id.
at 1239. The two cases are United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1991) and
United States v. Acheson, 672 F. Supp. 577 (D.N.H. 1987). See infra notes 154-56 and
267-72 and accompanying text for the facts and holdings of each case, respectively.
133. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Wallace, c.J., concurring).
134. Id. Chief Judge Wallace noted that the waiver could be effectuated by Rule
20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. See supra notes 41-42 and accom
panying text for a discussion of Rule 20. See also United States v. French, 7f!7 F.2d
1381, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing Rule 20 and the prerequisites to transfer);
United States v. Gallagher, 183 F.2d 342, 345-46 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
913 (1951).
135. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, 1., dissenting).
136. Id. The dissent pointed out that § 3145 refers to "the court having original
jurisdiction over the offense" while Rule 40 refers to "the district court in which prose
cution is pending." 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (1994); FED. R. CRIM. P. 40. See supra notes 35
and 59-60 for the pertinent text of Rule 40 and § 3145, respectively.
137. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). See supra note 102 for the
text of § 3231.
138. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
139. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting).

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

508

.[Vol. 18:487

defendant is the district court in the district of arrest. 140 Judge
Noonan noted that Rule 40 does not address the issue because sub
section (c) merely provides that the papers and bail will "go eventu
ally to 'the clerk of the district court in which the prosecution is
pending.'''141
Moreover, the dissent urged that the factors of section
3142(g)-applied in considering whether release of the defendant
on bail is appropriate-favor review in the district of arrest. 142 The
dissent determined that:
The great majority of these factors such as the person's "charac
ter, family ties, employment, financial condition, length of resi
dence, community ties" are best determined by the court in ,
which the person is apprehended if the person happens, as is
the case here, to be a resident of the district in which appre
hended. 143

Additionally, the dissent concluded that permitting review in the
district court to which the magistrate is attached assures the
promptness that is required by the United States Constitution and
mandated by section 3145. 144 The dissent argued that since the
magistrate is housed, in most districts, in the same courthouse
where the district court sits, access to the district court becomes
physically facilitated and immediate. 145
Of particular importance to the dissent in its analysis was the
nature of the relation between magistrate judges and Article III
judges.146 The dissent asserted that "[t]he normal system of appel
late review is territorial," thus, the ordinary procedure is that "[o]ne
goes from a magistrate to the district court which has appointed the
magistrate and then to the appellate court of the circuit in which the
magistrate and district court exist."147 The dissent claimed that it
was unlikely that Congress, in providing for review in section 3145,
intended to abandon this normal "territorial hierarchy" in the man
ner suggested by the majority.148
140.

Id.
141. Id. (emphasis added). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(c).
142. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). See 18 U.S.c. § 3142(g)
(1994). For the pertinent text of § 3142(g), see supra note 56.
143. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1239-40.
146. Id. at 1240.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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The dissent cited to the Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Raddatz 149 to emphasize that an analysis of the nature of
the relationship between magistrate judges and Article III judges is
criticaJ.150 The dissent considered Raddatz important because in
that opinion "the Supreme Court declared: 'the entire process takes
place under the district court's total control and jurisdiction. "'151
The dissent also cited United States v. Gebro, 152 which quoted
the language in Raddatz as "relevant to the relationship between
the district court and a magistrate judge ordering release on
bail."153 In Gebro, the defendant appealed the decision of a district
court judge to review "sua sponte"154 the magistrate judge's release
order. 155 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the district court had the authority to review the magis
149. 447 u.S. 667 (1980).
150. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Raddatz, 447 U.S. at
681). In Raddatz, the defendant appeared before a federal magistrate judge on a mo
tion to suppress evidence. 447 U.S. at 669. The magistrate recommended to deny the
motion and the defendant filed objections. Id. at 672. The district court accepted the
magistrate's recommendation, denied the defendant's motion to suppress, imd sen
tenced the defendant. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court's decision, finding that the defendant had been deprived of
due process because the district court failed to hear the controverted testimony. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the district court has plenary discretion
whether to authorize a magistrate to hold an evidentiary hearing," and, thus, the district
court in Raddatz did not deprive the defendant of due process by failing to hear the
controverted testimony. Id. at 681.
151. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (quoting Raddatz, 447 U.S.
at 681).
152. 948 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1991).
153. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Gebro, 948 F.2d at
1120).
154. "Sua sponte" means "[o]f his ... own will or motion; voluntarily; without
prompting or suggestion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990).
155. Gebro, 948 F.2d at 1120. The defendant in Gebro was charged with aiding
and abetting an armed bank robbery. [d. at 1119. The procedure challenged by the
defendant in Gebro was actually the second "bite at the apple" for the Government.
The defendant was originally charged and arrested for aiding and abetting a bank rob
bery, ordered detained by a magistrate judge, and ultimately convicted and sentenced.
[d. However, the conviction was reversed and remanded by the court of appeals due to
improper jury instructions. [d.
Because of a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, the district court dismissed the
original indictment and a new one was filed. Id. at 1119 n.2. The defendant was
brought before a magistrate judge and the government moved for pretrial detention.
[d. at 1119. The magistrate judge denied the motion for pretrial detention, and ordered
the defendant released on $25,000 bail. Id. At a trial setting hearing, the United States
district court judge indicated that he thought that the defendant was a flight risk, and
ordered a detention hearing. [d. At that detention hearing, the district court vacated
the magistrate judge's release order and ordered the defendant detained. Id. at 1119~
20.
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trate judge's order, stating that "'the entire process takes place
under the district court's total control and jurisdiction. "'156
The dissent in Evans recognized that Gebro was distinguish
able from the principal case. 157 However, the dissent contended
that Gebro was the closest precedent, "incorporat[ing] the tradi
tional understanding of the relationship of the magistrate judge to
the district court that appointed the magistrate judge."158 The
phrase "total control," the dissent argued, "suggests, even if it does
not absolutely require, the proximity of the magistrate judge to the
district court which is exercising control."159 Thus, the dissent con
cluded that requiring a district court thousands of miles away to
exercise "total control" over a magistrate judge who orders deten
tion or release creates a strange and unusual result,160 This result is
an improper increase in the magistrate judge's independence. 161 In
short, the dissent in Evans concluded that the defendant properly
sought review of the magistrate judge's detention order in the dis
trict of arrest. 162
III.

ANALYSIS

At issue in United States v. Evans is a determination of the
proper interpretation of section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act of
1984. 163 The legislative history of this statute provides no guidance
156. Id. at 1120 (quoting United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 (1980».
157. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting) ("At issue in Gebro was not
our question, so Gebro may be distinguished.").
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1239-40.
163. - See id. at 1235. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
recently had occasion to address preCisely the same issue faced by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Evans, on essentially the same facts, in"
United States v. Torres, 86 F.3d 1029 (11th Cir. 1996). In a very brief one-page opinion,
a majority of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that the plain
language of 18 U.S.c. § 3145 dictates that, in a multi-district proceeding, the court with
original jurisdiction over the offense is the district court in the prosecuting district. Id.
at 1031. The Torres majority relied exclusively on the Ninth Circuit's majority opinion
in Evans as the basis for its conclusion. Id. Judge Barkett dissented from the Torres
majority opinion, finding Judge Noonan's dissent in Evans the more persuasive ap
proach. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting). Neither the majority nor the dissent in Torres
added any independent discussion, elaboration, or analysis to the issue raised under
§ 3145. Instead, the majority and dissent adopted in full the reasoning of their respec
tive Ninth Circuit counterparts.
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in determining this issue. 164 In fact, courts that have addressed vari
ous issues arising out of multi-district proceedings have determined
that in drafting section 3145, "[i]t does not appear that Congress
gave any consideration to the problems that multi-district proceed
ings would generate. "165 The Senate Report prepared in connec
tion with the Bail Reform Act "seems only to contemplate
proceedings within a single district."166 Consequently, guidance
must be derived from other sources. The sources adopted in this
Note for determining the proper interpretation of section 3145 in
clude: a plain language analysis, the United States Constitution,
Rules 5 and 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, selected
sections within the Bail Reform Act of 1984, as well as case law.
This section of the Note will discuss and analyze these sources and
attempt to reconcile them with section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act
of 1984. In doing so, this Note concludes that the phrase "the court
having original jurisdiction over the offense" refers to the district
court in the district of prosecution.
A.

Plain Language of Section
1984

3i 45 of the Bail Reform Act of

The Evans majority determined that the best starting point in
ascertaining which district court is authorized to review the findings
of the magistrate judge under section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act,
especially in light of the absence of legislative intent, is an analysis
of the statutory language itself.167 Section 3145 states that either
164. See S. REp. No. 225, supra note 20, at 29-30, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3212-13.
165. United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 7fJ2, 704 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986). See gener
ally S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
166. Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 704 n.3. See also United States v. Melendez-Car
rion, 790 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir. 1986) ("There is no indication that Congress ... consid
ered the context of an arrest in a district other than the district of prosecution.");
United States v. Velasco, 879 F. Supp. 377, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Dominguez, 783
F.2d at 704 n.3); United States v. Acheson, 672 F. Supp. 577, 579 (D.N.H. 1987) (citing
Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 704 n.3.) ("As at least one court has aptly pointed out, it does
not appear that Congress in adopting the Bail Reform Act, gave any consideration to
the problems that multi-district proceedings would generate.").
167. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1236-38 (9th Cir. 1995). For a compre
hensive examination of the various theories behind statutory interpretation and con
struction, see generally Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Use of Legislative History in
Statutory Interpretation: A Look at Regents v. Bakke, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 57
(1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Rea
soning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice
Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 401
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the government or the defendant may seek review in "the court
having original jurisdiction over the offense. "168 The Evans court
initially focused on the use of the word "the" in the statute. 169
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, federal district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction over federal offenses. 170 In isolation, it
may appear as though section 3231 extends original jurisdiction to
all district courts of the United States.1 71 The Evans court, how
ever, determined that the language of section 3145 limits the choice
to one particular federal district court-"the" court with original
jurisdiction over the offense. l72 The statute does not refer to "any"
federal court or "all" federal courts, but limits review to "the" court
with original jurisdiction. If Congress had intended for any or all
federal district courts to have the authority to review the magistrate
judge's orders, it may well have used that broad language in the text
of section 3145. In the absence of that language, it is apparent that
Congress intended to restrict the courts from which to choose to a
single court.
(1994); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Laws as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989); John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U.
PA. L. REv. 1373 (1992). See also Susan G. Fentin, Note, Finding Middle Ground Be
tween Opportunity and Opportunism: The "Original Source" Provision of 31 V.S. C.
§ 3730(e)(4) , 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 255,285-90 (1995); Jane Ellen Warner, Note,
The Household Waste Exclusion Clarification; 42 V.S.c. Section 6921 (i): Did Congress
Intend to Exclude Municipal Solid Waste Ash from Regulation as Hazardous Waste
Under Subtitle C?, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 149, 167-75 (1994).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b) (1994) (emphasis added).
169. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236.
170. § 3231. See supra note 102 for the text of § 3231. Section 3231 has been
considered a broad grant of jurisdiction. See Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236; United States v.
Koloboski, 732 F.2d 1328, 1329-30 (7th Cir. 1984); Williams v. United States, 582 F.2d
1039, 1040 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); United States v. Wiseman, 445
F.2d 792, 797 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 967 (1971); United States v. Sasscer, 558 F.
Supp. 33, 36 (D. Md. 1982); United States v. Jackson, 374 F. Supp. 168, 173 (N.D. Ill.
1974), affd in part and rev'd in part, 508 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1975).
171. This was precisely the defendant's argument in Evans. The defendant main
tained that § 3231 grants all district courts "original jurisdiction" over federal offenses,
thus, any district court has the authority to review the magistrate judge's detention or
der. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1235-36. However, as the majority in Evans clarified, § 3231
merely designates that federal courts, rather than state courts, have jurisdiction over
federal offenses. Id. at 1236. The court stated that § 3231 does not specify exactly
which court is "the court having original jurisdiction over the offense" as used in § 3145.
Id. See supra notes 59 and 60 for the text of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3145(a) and (b) (1994),
respectively. Section 3145 possesses a narrower meaning than the "broad grant of origi
.
nal jurisdiction" conveyed in § 3231. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236.
172. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236. See § 3145(a), (b). There is no dispute among the
Evans court that the language of § 3145 of the Bail Reform Act refers to a single fed
eral district court. The dispute centers around which district court that is. See generally
Evans, 62 F.3d at 1233-40.
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Having determined that there is but one district court which is
authorized to review the magistrate judge's detention or release or
der, the majority in Evans asserted that the next step is to discern
which court that is.173 Because review is limited by the word "the"
to a single district court, it follows that there is only one district
court with "original jurisdiction over the offense" for the purposes
of detention or release decision review. In the multi-district con
text, however, there are two federal district courts with an arguable
interest in the determination of the defendant's detention or re
lease-the district court in the district of arrest and the district
court in the charging district. The majority in Evans concluded that
an analysis of the term "original jurisdiction" of section 3145 in
light of the constitutional restrictions on where a trial can be held
helps in determining which court is the proper district court for
review. 174
B.

Constitutional Guarantee of Venue: Determining Where the
Case can "Originally" be Brought

Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution and the
Sixth Amendment require the prosecution of federal crimes in the
district where the crimes were committed unless waived by the de
fendant. 175 The defendant can seek a dismissal of the prosecution
unless it is brought in that district,176 Since waiver can be effectu
ated, this is technically a matter of venue rather than jurisdiction. 177
However, until the defendant waives the right, the court that pos
sesses "original jurisdiction over the offense" is the court in the
"district wherein the crime shall have been committed."178
The dissent in Evans placed little emphasis on the effect of
these constitutional provisions. 179 The dissent conceded that the
broad grant of jurisdiction of section 3231 is limited by the Sixth
173. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236.
174. Id.
175. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See supra notes 71
and 72 and accompanying text for the pertinent language of Article III, Section 2,
Clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment, and for a discussion of the distinction between the
two provisions.
176. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1236.
177. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text discussing the distinction be
tween the concepts of venue and jurisdiction.
178. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ..
179. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). Judge Noonan never actu
ally mentioned Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution in his dissent,
although he did make reference to the Sixth Amendment. Id.
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Amendment to prosecution in the district where the crime was
committed. 180 However, the dissent suggested that this did not aid
in answering the. question, but really constituted the question it
self.181 Judge Noonan maintained that the Sixth Amendment only
helps in determining that section 3231 does not grant all district
courts jurisdiction to hear the case. 182
Emphasizing that the constitutional requirement was not "ju
risdictional," the dissent concluded that it was, more properly char
acterized as a venue requirement, which can be waived by the
defendant. 183 Thus, although the Sixth Amendment requires trial
in the district where the offense was committed, the "usual rules
governing venue and jurisdiction" render the Sixth Amendment
"requirement" ambiguous for the purpose of determining which
district court has the authority to review under section 3145. 184
One of the "usual rules" referred to by the dissent is doubt
lessly Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 85 Rule
20 accords the defendant the right to waive trial in the district of
prosecution and allow the district of arrest to hear the case.1 86
However, a defendant seeking to transfer under this provision does
not receive an "automatic" transfer.1 87 The transfer is subject to
the approval of the prosecuting attorneys for both the arresting and
charging districts. 188 Consequently, it is apparent that the district
court in the district of arrest is without the authority to hear and try
the case absent consent by the government attorneys for both
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. Thus, the dissent argued that the Sixth Amendment does not answer the
question of which district court has authority to review the magistrate judge's orders.
Id. The dissent urged that the Sixth Amendment merely provides that no district court
could be chosen at random to hear the review of a magistrate judge's detention order.
183. Id. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text discussing the distinction
between jurisdiction and venue.
184. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). See U.S. CONST. amend VI
("right tei ... trial[ ] by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed").
185. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20.
186. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20(a). The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules
state that "[t]his rule would accord to a defendant ... an opportunity to secure disposi
tion of the case in the district where the arrest takes place, thereby relieving him of
whatever hardship may be involved in a removal to the place where the prosecution is
pending." FED. R. CruM. P. 20 advisory committee's note.
187. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20(a).
188. Id. See supra note 41 for the pertinent language of Federal Rule 20(a). The
requirement of approval by both United States attorneys is intended to control the
danger of forum shopping by the defendant. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20 advisory committee's
note.
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districts. 189
In contrast to the dissent, the majority in Evans placed its em
phasis on the constitutional requirement that prosecution could be
"originally" brought only in the federal district court of the district
where the crime was alleged to have been committed.1 90 Because
the Constitution mandates that the defendant shall be accorded
trial in the district where the crime was committed-Le., the district
of prosecution-the district court in that district is the only tribunal
with true "original" jurisdiction over theoffense. 191 The term
"original jurisdiction" refers to the "fj]urisdiction of [a] court to
take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it, and pass judgment
upon the law and facts. "192 The district court in the charging dis
trict is the only court with the ability to take cognizance of the case
at its inception. 193 Accordingly, the district court in the charging
district is the only court with "original jurisdiction. "194
It is evident that this rationale is proper when analyzed under
the notion that there is a single district court with "original jurisdic
tion over the offense."195 Additionally, although the district of
arrest may obtain jurisdiction over the defendant, it may do so only
in a circumstance where the defendant has waived his right to be
tried in accordance with the Constitution. 196 This does not consti
tute "original jurisdiction" as that term is used in the review provi
sion of the Bail Reform Act. 197 Thus, under the language of section
3145, "the court having original jurisdiction," in the context of a
multi-district proceeding, refers to the district court in the district
where the crime was committed.
189. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20(a).
190. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1995).
191. See discussion supra part I.C.
192. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
193. The district court in the district of arrest can take cognizance of the case only
in the event of an approved waiver. This is not cognizance at its "inception."
194. See United States v. Spilotro, 786 F.2d 808, 813 (8th Cir. 1986) (Addressing
section 3146(e) of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 (repealed 1984): "[T]he magistrate ...
of the court which has original jurisdiction over the offense charged [the district court in
the charging district] has the authority to amend conditions of release previously set in
another district by another magistrate."); United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886, 890
(11th Cir. 1982) (district judge in the charging district "had authority as the court with
original jurisdiction over the case to amend the conditions of appellants' release");
United States v. Zuccaro, 645 F.2d 104, 105 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (referring to district
court in the charging district as the court with original jurisdiction over the offense),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981).
195. See discussion supra part III.A.
196. See discussion supra part I.e. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 20.
197. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b) (1994).
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Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Federal Rule 40 is the procedural starting point in a multi-dis
trict case such as Evans. In addition, an examination of the lan
guage of the Rule itself provides some insight into determining
which court is authorized to review the magistrate judge's order
under section 3145. 198 Rule 40 provides further support for the
conclusion that the distriCt court in the prosecuting district is the
proper tribunal for review.
1.

Rule 40(a)

To ensure that there will be no "unnecessary delay," Rule
40(a) requires a defendant to be brought before the nearest avail
able magistrate judge for a pretrial determination of bai1. 199 How
ever, the defendant can waive this requirement. 2oo Rule 40(a)
grants the defendant the right to "elect[] to have the preliminary
examination conducted in the district in which the prosecution is
pending."201 This right of election supports the conclusion that the
district court in the charging district is the only properly authorized
tribunal to review the magistrate judge's orders in two ways. First,
it shows that the role of the magistrate judge, before whom the de
fendant first appears in the district of arrest, is a limited one. The
defendant is able to circumvent the magistrate judge in the district
of arrest to have the detention hearing conducted in the charging
district if he so chooses. 202 That the role of the magistrate judge in
the district of arrest is limited in such a manner lends support to the
conclusion that the charging district should take over as soon as
possible.203 More importantly, the right of election indicates that
198. The majority and concurrence in Evans consulted Rule 40 in helping to as
certain the proper interpretation of § 3145 of the Bail Reform Act. See United States v.
Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1235-39 (9th Cir. 1995).
199. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(a). See supra note 36 discussing the purpose behind the
"no unnecessary delay" requirement of Rule 4O(a), and the relation of Rule 4O(a) to
Rules 5 and 5.1.
200. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a).
201. Id. The Advisory Committee's Note to the 1979 amendment of Rule 40(a)
states: "A defendant might wish to elect that alternative when, for example, the law in
that district is that the complainant and other material witnesses may be required to
appear at the preliminary examination and give testimony." FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(a)
advisory committee's note.
202. See the election right provision of FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(a).
203. If the charging district should take over as soon as possible, the inference is
that the charging district should also be the district to review the orders of the magis
trate. See United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 1995) (Wallace, c.J.,
concurring).
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the Federal Rules favor prompt review of detention orders over
prompt determinations of detention or release. 204 If the defendant
elects to have the detention hearing conducted in the district of
prosecution, it is clear that more of a delay will ensue than if the
defendant had not exercised the right. From these conclusions
flows the inference that review is appropriate only in the charging
district. This inference is further bolstered by analyzing the pecu
liar results that follow if the district court in the district of arrest is
authorized to review the magistrate judge's determination of deten
tion or release.
In a multi-district case, the defendant must appear before the
nearest magistrate judge in the district of arrest for the "preliminary
proceedings.''205 Under Rule 4O(a), the defendant is entitled to
elect to have the detention hearing conducted in the charging dis
triCt. 206 A defendant who chooses to exercise that right must then
be transferred to the charging district for the detention hearing. 207
In the event the orders issued by the magistrate judge are disputed
by either the government or the defendant, sections 3145(a) and (b)
of the Bail Reform Act allow either party to file a motion for re
view. 208 Requiring the motion for review to be filed with the dis
trict court in the district of arrest would compel a transfer of the
defendant back to the arresting district. 209 This result is untenable
for two reasons. First, it contravenes the mandate of section 3145
of the Bail Reform Act that motions for review "shall be deter
204. The concurrence in Evans determined that the defendant's "right of election
indicates that the fundamental purpose of having the preliminary examination con
ducted by the nearest available magistrate judge is to ensure that the defendant is not
prevented from obtaining prompt review of his detention." Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wal
lace, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). This language illustrates a dual purpose be
hind the requirement of the appearance of the defendant before the nearest available
magistrate judge. The first purpose is to protect the defendant from prejudicial delay.
See supra note 36. The second is to ensure the defendant prompt review of his deten
tion. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wallace, C.J., concurring). See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b)
(1994) ("The motion [for revocation or amendment of the conditions of the detention
order] shall be determined promptly.").
205. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.
206. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a).
2m. Id.
208. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b) (1994).
209. See discussion supra part III.A reaching the conclusion that there is one
and only one-district court with the authority to review the magistrate judge's orders.
Either the district court in the arresting district or the district court in the charging
district has the authority to review, but not both. Consequently, there cannot be a
flexible determination, on a case by case basis, of the proper district court for review
depending on where the defendant chooses to have the detention hearing conducted.
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mined promptly."210 Second, Federal Rule 40(a) requires the de
fendant to ultimately answer for the alleged offenses in the charging
district. 211 This would necessitate a third transfer of the defend
ant-from the district of arrest back to the charging district for trial.
In order to avoid multiple transfers of the defendant and un
due delay of this kind in the review of detention, the district court
in the charging district must be the proper tribunal to review the
orders of the magistrate judge. Adherence to this conclusion avoids
this problematic scenario and leads to consistency in pretrial
procedure. 212
2.

Rule 40(c)

Federal Rule 40(c) also strongly supports the position that the
proper court to review the magistrate judge's order is the district
court in which prosecution is pending. Rule 40(c) provides that af
ter the detention hearing is conducted and a determination of de
tention or release is reached, "the papers in the proceeding and any
bail taken shall be transmitted to the clerk of the district court in
which prosecution is pending."213 It would be illogical to require
the papers and bail to be forwarded to the district in which prosecu
tion is pending if review was to be conducted in the district of
arrest.214 Thus, Rule 40(c) illustrates the proper contemplation of
review in the district of prosecution in a multi-district proceeding.
The dissent in Evans, however, disregarded the inconsistencies
that would seemingly arise in concluding that the proper district
court to review is the district of arrest. 215 The dissent urged that
210. § 3145(a), (b).
211. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a).
212. To illustrate the ensuing consistency in procedure. if the defendant decides
not to exercise the election right under Rule 4O(a), the pretrial bail determination oc
curs promptly in the arresting district. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a). The review then takes
place in the charging district, where the trial is req~ired to be conducted under Rule
4O(a). [d. On the other hand, if the defendant chooses to exercise the right of election,
substantially the same procedure results. The defendant receives the prompt appear
ance before the magistrate judge in the arresting district. The only change is that the
detention hearing is conducted in the charging district, the same district where the re
view and trial are to be conducted. This procedure averts any unwarranted delay and
avoids subjecting the defendant to as many as three transfers between the arresting
district and charging district.
213. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(c). The full text of Rule 4O(c) states: "If a defendant is
held or discharged, the papers in the proceeding and any bail taken shall be transmitted
to the clerk of the district court in which the prosecution is pending." FED. R. CRIM. P.
4O(c).
.
214. See United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 1995).
215. [d. at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
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Rule 40(c) does not necessarily specify that the papers and bail
must go to the district court in which prosecution is pending for
review. 216 Rather, the papers and bail merely need to "eventually"
reach the charging district. 217 The dissent concluded that once the
issue of detention or release is resolved-either by the magistrate
judge or by the district court on review-the papers are to be trans
ferred at that point. 218
The dissent's reasoning, however, fails to fully consider the im
plications of this interpretation of Rule 40(c). In light of the plain
language of section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act,219 the principles
underlying the applicable constitutional provisions,22o and the elec
tion right provision contained within Rule 4O(a),221 a reasonable in
terpretation of the language is that the papers and bail are to be
sent immediately following the magistrate judge's determination of
detention or release. 222 The conclusion of immediate transfer logi
cally flows from an adherence to the notion of procedural consis
tency. As previously illustrated, any other interpretation leads to
inconsistent and anomalous results-an outcome surely not in
tended by Congress.
An alternative approach to undermining the.dissent's reason
ing with regard to Rule 40(c) is to construe the requirement of the
transfer of the papers and bail as a limitation on the role of the
magistrate judge in the arresting district. 223 The dissent reasoned
that Rule 4O(c) is ambiguous because it does not specify exactly at
what point the papers and bail are to be transferred. 224 However,
216. [d.
217. [d.
218. [d. The dissent stated that Rule 40(c) fails to address the issue because the
"Rule does not determine whether the district court which has appointed the magistrate
shall first have reviewed the decision." Id.
219. See discussion supra part III.A.
220. See discussion supra part III.B.
221. See discussion supra part III.C.l.
222. The papers and bail should be sent immediately as opposed to "eventually"
as suggested by the dissent in Evans. See Evans. 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan. J.•
dissenting).
223. The approach adopted by the dissent in Evans expands the role of the arrest
ing district by requiring the detention hearing as well as review to be conducted in the
arresting district. Id. The approach endorsed by the majority and concurrence, how
ever. effectively limits the role of the arresting district to, at most. the pretrial determi
nation of detention or release by the magistrate judge. [d. at 1236-39.
224. Id. at 1239 (Noonan. J., dissenting). See supra notes 215-18 and accompany
ing text. The ambiguous language, as contended by the dissent, consists of the first part
of Rule 4O(c) which states: "If a defendant is held or discharged ...." FED. R. CRIM. P.
4O(c).
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an analysis of other subdivisions within Rule 40 reveals that the lan
guage is not as unclear as the dissent asserts.225
For example, subdivision (a) of Rule 40 addresses the appear
ance of the defendant before the magistrate judge. 226 Subdivision
(b) addresses the required statement to the defendant by the magis
trate judge regarding the provisions of Federal Rule 20. 227 These
observations are noteworthy because the subdivisions only address
activities concerning the magistrate judge, not the. district court
judge who conducts review. 228 Moreover, Rule 40 makes no refer
ence at all to review of the magistrate judge's pretrial bail determi
nation. 229 Therefore, it seems that Rule 40(c) is not ambiguous,
but, rather, quite clear that its application is limited to the detention
or discharge of the defendant by the magistrate judge. The conclu
sion of the dissent in Evans improperly broadens the scope of the
Rule 40(c) transfer of papers and bail to apply to detention or re
lease decisions by the magistrate judge and by the district court
judge in the district of arrest. Nothing in the language of the Rule
suggests such a construction. The foregoing analysis clarifies· that
the magistrate judge's role in the proceedings is a limited one, and
that pursuant to Rule 40(c) the prosecuting district should take over
as soon as possible.
D.

"Requisite Familiarity" Requirement of Section 3142(g) of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984

Section 3142(g) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was employed
by both the concurrence230 and dissent231 in Evans to support each
opinion's determination of the appropriate interpretation of section
3145.232 This subsection of the Note analyzes how each opinion ap
225. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 40.
226. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(a).
227. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(b).
228. All of the subdivisions of Rule 40 address the procedures to be followed by
the magistrate judge in the district of arrest in a multi-district case. See generally FED.
R. CRIM. P. 40. None of the subdivisions indicate contemplation of application or rela
tion to the district judge who conducts review at the district court level.
229. Review of pretrial bail determinations is specifically provided for in § 3145
of the Bail Reform Act. 18 U.S.c. § 3145 (1994). Rule 40 does not address detention
or release of the defendant-it is merely concerned with the pretrial criminal procedure
in the multi-district context. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 40.
230. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 1995) (Wallace, c.J.,
concurring).
231. Id. at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
232. See 18 U.S.c. § 3142(g) (1994). Section 3142(g) requires the magistrate
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proached section 3142(g), how other courts have interpreted the
provision, and how to resolve the interpretive problem.
Section 3142(g) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 presents the
factors to be considered by the judicial officer in reaching a deter
mination of whether to release a defendant on bail. 233 Some of the
factors sweep rather broadly234 while others require a more per
sonal, knowledgeable assessment of the defendant. 235 Section
3142(g)(3) mandates that the judicial officer shall take into account
the available information concerning personal factors including: the
person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, em
ployment, financial resources, length of residence in the commu
nity, and community ties. 236 Sections 3142(g)(1) and (2) require the
judicial officer to consider the nature and circumstances of the of
fense and the weight of the evidence against the person.237 Because
review of a magistrate judge's orders by the district court is de
novo, consideration of these factors arises again on review under
section 3145. 238
The factors required to be considered by the judicial officer
generate two approaches to the determination of the appropriate
tribunal for review. Under the first approach, the focus centers on
the judicial officer's familiarity with the nature and circumstances of
the offense as required by section 3142(g)(1),239 and the weight of
the evidence against the person under subsection (g)(2).240 Propo
nents of this approach conclude that the proper district court to re
view the pretrial bail decision is the district court in the charging
district because that district is best able to review with the proper
knowledge and background mandated by section 3142(g).241
judge to take into consideration many factors concerning the defendant and the alleged
crime. See supra note 56 for the pertinent text of § 3142(g).
233. § 3142(g).
234. See § 3142(g)(I), (2).
235. See § 3142(g)(3)(A).
236. Id.
237. § 3142(g)(I), (2).
238. "[T]he district court judge may begin anew and simply follow the procedures
set out in [the Bail Reform] Act [§]3142." Pringle, supra note 63, at 922. See generally
United States v. Torres, 929 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1991). See also supra notes 63-66 and
accompanying text discussing the district court's de novo standard of review.
239. See § 3142(g)(I).
240. See § 3142(g)(2).
241. The approach that the district court in the district of prosecution is the
proper tribunal to review the determination of bail is the approach adopted by the
concurring opinion in Evans. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Wallace, C.J., concurring). This approach receives support from both the Second and
Seventh Circuits. See United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir.
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The second approach focuses on the judicial officer's familiar
ity with the history and personal characteristics of the defendant
pursuant to section 3142(g)(3).242 Advocates of this approach con
clude that the pretrial bail decision of the magistrate judge is prop
erly reviewed by the district court in the district of arrest. 243 The
basis for this conclusion is that when a defendant is arrested in the
district in which he resides, that district possesses the requisite fa
miliarity under section 3142(g).244 .
1.

Requisite Familiarity in the District of Prosecution

Two federal courts of appeals decisions that have addressed the
issue of which court has the requisite familiarity with a particular de
fendant and the defendant's case are United States v. Dominguez 245
1986) (holding that the evidence necessary to make the detennination of whether to
release or detain the defendant will be located primarily in the district where prosecu
tion is pending); United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the most infonned decisions concerning release or detention will be made
by the prosecutors and courts in the district where prosecution is pending). See also
United States v. Velasco, 879 F. Supp. 377, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the most
infonned decisions concerning bail or release will be made in the district where prose
cution is pending); United States v. Jones, 804 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (S.D. Ind. 1992)
(holding that the Bail Refonn Act "recognizes a 'local' interest in the originating juris
diction which may be different than the interests of the jurisdiction in which the arrest
occurs").
242. See § 3142(g)(3).
243. The approach that the arresting district is the proper district to review is the
approach adopted by the dissent in Evans. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissent
ing). Several district courts lend support to this approach. See, e.g., United States v.
Johnson, 858 F. Supp. 119, 122 (N.D. Ind. 1994); United States v. Acheson, 672 F. Supp.
577,579 (D.N.H. 1987).
244. See Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting); Johnson, 858 F. Supp. at
122 (holding that a magistrate judge in the charging district has no authority to review
an order denying detention issued by another magistrate judge in the arresting district);
Acheson, 672 F. Supp. at 579 (stating that "[ilt is difficult to ascertain how ... personal
history and ties to the community can be developed unless by hearing before the judi
cial officer in the community in which the defendant has resided," which is where the
defendant was arrested, but holding that the district court in the district of arrest had no
authority to set aside an ex parte order issued by a magistrate in the district of
prosecution).
245. 783 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1986). In Dominguez, the defendants were indicted in
the Northern District of Indiana on drug-trafficking charges and were arrested in Flor
ida where they appeared before a federal magistrate judge. Id. at 703. The magistrate
judge set the defendants' bond at one million dollars. Id. After removal proceedings in
Florida, the defendants were transported to Indiana. Id. At the defendants' first ap
pearance in Indiana, the government moved for a pretrial hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.c.
§ 3142(e). Id. See supra note 50 and accompanying text discussing § 3142(f). At the
hearing, the defendants were ordered detained. Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 703.
The defendants filed motions for revocation of the magistrate judge's detention
order with the district judge in Indiana and the district judge revoked the order. Id.
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and United States v. Melendez-Carrion. 246 In Dominguez, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, in
a removal proceeding, a detention hearing should not be conducted
in the arresting district. 247 A detention hearing in the arresting dis
trict would place the bail decision in the hands of persons much less
concerned about the ultimate outcome of the proceedings. 248 The
court of appeals concluded that the district of arrest is less likely to
possess the requisite knowledge of the defendant and of the charges
against him to make an informed decision regarding detention or
release. 249
However, the district judge then conducted a de novo hearing on a motion by the de
fendants to modify the Florida bond, at which the district judge ordered the defendants
detained. Id.
The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Id. They argued that the district court judge did not have the authority to
detain them because the government had waived its right to pretrial detention by not
raising it at the defendants' first appearance before the magistrate judge in Florida. Id.
at 704. The court of appeals rejected the defendants' claim and held that the motion for
detention in the charging district was timely. Id. at 705.
246. 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986). The case is a consolidation of the appeals of
eight individuals. The defendants were indicted in the district of Connecticut. Id. at
988. Seven of the defendants were arrested in Puerto Rico and the eighth was arrested
in Dallas, Texas. Id. The defendants were brought before the federal magistrate judge
in their respective arresting districts, but the cases were removed to the charging district
before a detention hearing was conducted. Id. at 989. Consequently, the detention
hearings were conducted before the federal magistrate judge in Connecticut. Id.
The magistrate judge ordered six of the eight defendants detained and the remain
ing two released on bail. Id. at 990. The government sought review of the two release
orders in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, and the dis
trict court judge reversed the release orders and ordered the remaining two defendants
detained. Id.
On appeal, the defendants raised procedural challenges to the detention and re
moval proceedings, arguing that a removal proceeding may not precede the detention
hearing. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the
removal proceedings could precede the detention hearing, relying on Dominguez. Jd.
See Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 704-05.
247. Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 704.
248. Id.
249. Jd. The court also recognized that if prosecutors in the arresting district
were required to seek detention at the first appearance of defendants, they would often
rely on "automatic" requests for continuances to obtain the relevant information from
the charging district, which would possibly result in unnecessarily extended detention.
Id. The court conceded that there is support in the legislative history of the Bail Re
form Act that "automatic" continuances are available to the government to help facili
tate preparation for detention hearings, but that they should not be used in a
"wholesale fashion" by courts or prosecutors. Jd. at 704-05. See S, REp. No. 225, supra
note 20, at 21-22, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3204-05. The court noted, however,
that "[i]t does not appear that Congress gave any consideration to the problems that
multi-district proceedings would generate," and that "[t]he [Senate] Report seems only
to contemplate proceedings within a single district." Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 704 n.3.
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The court.supported its position by analyzing section 3142(g)
of the Bail Reform Act. 250 The court stated that in light of sections
3142(g)(1) and (2), the best assessment of the nature of the charged
offense and weight of evidence against the defendant "will most as
suredly be available" in the district of prosecution. 251
In a similar situation to Dominguez, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Melendez-Carrion, stated thaht
was very unlikely that Congress would have intended detention
hearings to occur in districts "scattered across the country in which
those accused . . . might happen to be arrested. "252 Furthermore,
the court concluded that the "decision whether to seek detention
and the evidence necessary to support a finding of dangerousness
and risk of flight sufficient to justify detention will normally be lo
cated primarily in the district of prosecution."253
However, the Second Circuit recognized that there may be cir
cumstances in which pertinent evidence may also be located in the
arresting district. 254 The court noted that if the defendant is a resi
dent of the district of arrest, he can be afforded protection from
inaccessibility to evidence that may be beneficial or relevant to the
defendant's case. 255 If the evidence of certain personal factors that
a defendant may wish to present can be reasonably obtained only in
the district of arrest, the court suggested that the defendant should
be given the opportunity to present such evidence. 256 Presumably,
the locally available evidence--concerning the defendant's "roots"
in the community or other factors-would be presented to the mag
istrate judge in a preliminary hearing. 257 This heariilg, however,
250. Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 705.
251. Id. at 705. The court concluded that in light of the factors to be considered
under § 3142(g)(1) and (2), "the most informed decisions will almost always be made in
the charging district by prosecutors that have supervised the investigations and by
courts that will supervise the remaining proceedings." Id. The court further stated that
"[ilt makes no sense to mandate in multi-district situations that ... procedures be con
ducted in the district court with the lesser interest in the defendant and less complete
knowledge of his case." Id.
Dominguez also went on to address the defendants' substantive challenges to the
district judge's determination of dangerousness under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Those issues
are not raised in United States v. Evans and are beyond the scope of this Note.
252. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir. 1986).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. See infra notes 276-91 and accompanying text for a thorough discussion
of the Second Circuit's approach in Melendez-Carrion concerning the defendant's op
portunity to present evidence.
257. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990.
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would not constitute a "detention hearing" in the district of
arrest. 258 The record of that proceeding would then be transferred
to the district of prosecution for the actual detention hearing. 259
In light of these two appellate decisions, it is evident that the
district court in the charging district is the proper tribunal to review
the detention or release order issued by the magistrate judge in the
district of arrest. The district of prosecution will arguably have·
more familiarity with the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged. 260 In a situation where evidence of the personal character
istics of the defendant is important, the prosecuting district will also
have access to that evidence. Under the de novo standard of re
view, the considerations of section 3142(g) in determining detention
or release again become controlling for the district court judge.
2.

Requisite Familiarity in the District of Arrest

The dissent in Evans argued that, in certain circumstances, the
district court in the district of arrest will have the requisite familiar
ity with the defendant to make the determination of whether to re
lease the defendant back into the community.261 The dissent
asserted that the factors to be considered on review under section
3142(g) "are best determined by the court in which the person is
apprehended if the person happens ... to be a resident of the dis
trict in which apprehended. "262
This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the
dissent's conclusion only contemplates which district court is appro
priate for review if the defendant resides in the arresting district.
The next logical question, which the dissent's approach fails to con
sider, is: Which district court is appropriate for review if the defend
ant does not reside in the arresting district? The dissent's approach,
in effect, addresses only half of the question.
Moreover, the conclusion reached by the dissent is illogical in a
situation where the defendant does not reside in, or have any ties
to, the arresting district. There is no rational reason t~ require the
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 1995) (Wallace, c.J.,
concurring); United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1986);
Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. See also United States v. Velasco, 879 F. Supp. 377,
378 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Jones, 804 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
261. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting). See 18 U.S.c.
§ 3142(g)(3)(A) (1994). See also supra note 56 for the pertinent text of § 3142(g).
262. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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filing of a motion for review in the arresting district in a situation
where the defendant has no ties to that district. Nevertheless, the
dIssent's approach concludes that the tribunal authorized to hear
the motion for review under section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act is
the district court in the district of arrest. 263
The dissent in Evans also asserted that "Congress may well
have supposed that [the scenario in which the defendant is arrested
in the district of residence] was the more common one and that
therefore the district of arrest should be the district to determine
bail."264 It is possible that Congress "may well have" contemplated
that the scenario in which the defendant is arrested in the district
where he resides is the more common scenario. However, Congress
has provided no guidance on this point.265 Additionally, at least
one commentator has stated that "people today are far more likely
to commit crimes outside their district of residence than they once
were."266 It is equally as possible that people are more commonly
arrested outside of their district of residence than within. Thus,
Congress may well have contemplated that the more common sce
nario is one in which the defendant is arrested in a district in which
he does not reside. In any event, it seems that the Evans dissent
has tailored, indeed manufactured, congressional intent to fit its
conclusion, rather than tailor its conclusion to fit congressional
intent.
The dissent's view appears at first blush to receive some sup
port from United States v. Acheson. 267 In Acheson, the district
court judge in the district of arrest held that he did not have juris
diction to set aside an ex parte order of detention issued by the
263. Id. at 1239-40. See § 3145(a), (b). See supra notes 59 and 60 for the perti
nent text of § 3145(a) and (b), respectively.
264. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
265. See generally S. REp. No. 225, supra note 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182.
266. Note, supra note 72, at 107 n.89 (discussing the erosion of certain policy
justifications behind the concept of venue).
267. 672 F. Supp. 577 (D.N.H. 1987). In Acheson, the defendant was indicted by
the grand jury in the District of Nevada and arrested in New Hampshire, his state of
residence. Id. at 578. The defendant was brought before a federal magistrate judge in
New Hampshire and the government moved for a pretrial detention hearing. Id. The
magistrate judge admitted the defendant to bail and the government sought review of
the release order in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. Id. at
577-78. The district court judge in Nevada issued an ex parte order staying the order by
the New Hampshire magistrate judge admitting the defendant to bail. Id. at 577. The
defendant appealed that decision to the United States District Court for the District of
New Hampshire. Id. at 580.
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district court judge in the district of prosecution. 268 In dicta, how
ever, the judge noted that the personal history of the defendant is
best evaluated in a hearing before the magistrate judge in the com
munity in which the defendant resides. 269
The dicta in Acheson supports the approach that the requisite
familiarity of the defendant under 3142(g) lies with the district of
arrest. 270 However, the actual decision of the district court illus
trates that this approach holds little weight. The district judge in
Acheson recognized that review was properly sought in the district
court in the charging district because only that district court had
"original jurisdiction over the offense."271 Accordingly, the district
court judge in Acheson held that the district court in the arresting
district had no authority to set aside the charging district's ex parte
order of detention. 272
The dissent in Evans specifically based its conclusion on the
fact that the personal factors of section 3142(g)(3) are best consid
ered by the arresting district. 273 This conclusion, however, receives
little valuable support and leads to inconsistencies in federal crimi
nalpretrial procedure.
3. Reconciliation of the Competing Views
Under section 3142(g) of the Bail Reform Act, the factors con
sidered in determining whether to release or detain a defendant en
compass a full range of inquiry-from general knowledge of the
defendant and the surrounding circumstances to intricate personal
details. 274 In essence, section 3142(g) involves a balancing test in
268. Id.
Id. at 579. The judge recognized this as such "at least in cases where, as
here, such residence has been continuous for a period of approximately three and one
half years." Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. (quoting United States v. Spilotro, 786 F.2d 808, 815 (8th Cir. 1986». In
Spilotro, the court held that, in a multi-district proceeding, sua sponte review of an out
of-district magistrate judge's conditions of release was appropriate. The court stated:
We ... hold that § 3146(e) [now repealed] granted the court with original
jurisdiction over the offense charged the authority to amend sua sponte and at
any time the conditions of release.
hold otherwise would sharply restrict
the discretion of the trial court to determine pretrial matters. In addition, re
quiring a remand of the case to the releasing judicial officer in order to amend
conditions of release would waste limited judicial resources.
Spilotro, 786 F.2d at 815.
272. Acheson, 672 F. Supp. at 580.
273. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 1995). See 18 U.S.c.
§ 3142(g)(3) (1994).
274. § 3142(g). See supra note 56 for the pertinent text of § 3142(g).
269.

To
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which the key is to weigh the various factors to determine whether
the defendant is a risk of flight or a danger to the community.275
The outcome of the determination depends on the evidence and
information adduced before the magistrate judge at the detention
hearing or the district judge on review. The challenge faced here is
to determine which district is best able to gain access to and evalu
ate that evidence and information.
The approach set out by the Second Circuit in Melendez-Car
rion elucidates the proper procedural solution. 276 Under the Sec
ond Circuit's approach, it is reasonable to conclude that review in a
multi-district proceeding is properly sought only in the district court
in the charging district pursuant to section 3145.277 The charging
district is the district which issues the indictment and warrant, and
the prosecutors who have conducted the appropriate investigations
are located there. 278 Therefore, on review, the district of prosecu
tion is normally the district best able to make the determination of
whether the defendant is a danger to the community or a risk of
flight. 279
However, situations may arise in which the defendant wishes to
introduce evidence of personal factors to counter the government's
evidence favoring detention. 280 This evidence may only be avail
able in the district of arrest,when that coincides with the defend
ant's place of residence. In such a situation, the Melendez-Carrion
court has stated:
Where practical, consideration should be given to affording the
defendant, arrested in his district of residence, an opportunity in
that district promptly to present locally available evidence perti
nent to the issue of pretrial release so that a transcript of such
evidence can be prepared and furnished to the judicial officer
275. § 3142(g).
276. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir. 1986). See
supra notes 246 and 252-59 and accompanying text for the facts and holding of
Melendez-Carrion.
277. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990.
278. Id.
279. Id. See 18 U.S.c. § 3142(f) (1994). which provides that a detention hearing
shall be held to "reasonably assure the appearance of [aJ person as required and the
safety of any other person and the community." See supra note 50 for the pertinent
text of § 3142(f).
280. These situations arise when the government introduces evidence showing
that the defendant is a danger to the community or a risk of flight and should be de
tained. § 3142(f). See also § 3142(g). The defendant may have access to rebutting evi
dence to show that the factors of § 3142(g) weigh in his favor. See supra note 56 for the .
pertinent text of § 3142(g).
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making the detention decision in the district of prosecution.281
This approach, as set out in Melendez-Carrion, is consistent
with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Bail Reform
Act of 1984. The Federal Rules require the defendant to be
brought in an "initial appearance" before the nearest federal magis
trate judge. 282 Under the Bail Reform Act, a detention hearing is
to be held upon the defendant's "first appearance" before the judi
cial officer. 283 Although these two requirements appear to be
eq~ivalent, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir
cuit, in Dominguez, held that they should not be interpreted as
such. 284 The court suggested that the term "initial appearance"
under the Federal Rules refers to the first appearance of the de
fendant before a judicial officer, whether in the arresting district or
the charging district. 285 However, the term "first appearance"
under the Bail Reform Act refers to "the first appearance before
any judicial officer."286 Thus, the defendant could have "as many
'first appearances' as judicial officers his bail determination came
before."287
In the procedure suggested by the court in Melendez-Carrion,
the defendant is afforded the "initial appearance" required under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in the district of arrest. 288
Then, the detention hearing is properly conducted at the "first ap
pearance" before the judicial officer in the charging district. 289
Under the Dominguez gloss, this type of procedure is consistent
with both the Federal Rules and the Bail Reform Act of 1984.
281. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. See also United States v. Dominguez,
783 F.2d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 1986) ("In some cases, ... circumstances may make it appro
priate to request detention in the arresting district. ").
282. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text discussing
Federal Rule 5.
283. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
284. Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 704 ("Although it is semantically tempting to equate
the expressions 'initial appearance' and 'first appearance', [sic] we do not believe that
such an interpretation is consistent with the policies behind pretrial detention or with
the requirements for its employment under the Bail Reform Act.").
285. Id.
286. Id. at 705 (emphasis added). Accord United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479,
1482-83 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
287. Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 705.
288. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir. 1986). The
"initial appearance" constitutes the first appearance before the magistrate judge for the
purpose of informing the defendant of certain rights and requirements-under Rule
5(c)-and for allowing the defendant "to present locally available evidence." Id. See
supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text discussing Federal Rule 5.
289. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990.
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Although Melendez-Carrion involved removal of the defend
ant from the district of arrest before the detention hearing was con
ducted, distinguishing it from the situation in Evans ,290 the
underlying principles of the Second Circuit's reasoning can never
theless be applied in the Evans. context. The ·purpose of the sug
gested initial proceeding in the district of arrest under the guidance
of Melendez-Carrion is to assure the defendant access to vital evi
dence only available in the district of arrest, when that coincides
with the defendant's district of residence. 291 In the situation where
a detention hearing has occurred in the district of arrest prior to
removal, as in Evans, the defendant's con<;:ern-as well as the dis
sent's concern in Evans-should be alleviated. 292 When removal is
effectuated, or when review of the detention order. is ·sought in the
charging district, a record of any pertinent evidence adduced before
the magistrate judge in the arresting district can be provided to the
charging district.
.
The procedure outlined iIi Melendez-Carrion conforms with
the de novo standard of review .as well. Although true de novo
review would require the district court to reassess the case com
pletely anew,293 most cases that have addressed the issue of the
proper standard of review allow the district courts a certain amount
of discretion in the de novo assessment. 294 For example, in United
States v. Fortna,295 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that when the district court acts on a motion to amend
or revoke a magistrate judge's detention order, the court acts de
novo. 296 However, the Fifth Circuit added that the district court
could base its determination on evidence presented to the magis
trate judge supported by additional evidence adduced before the
district court.297 Thus, under this standard, the district court has at
its disposal the record of the magistrate's findings-subject to in
290. Id. at 989; United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1995). In
Evans, the issue involved detennining the proper tribunal for review of a magistrate
judge's detention order. Id. In Melendez-Carrion, the issue involved detennining the
proper tribunal for the original detennination of detention or release rather than re
view. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 984.
291. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990.
292. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1234-35.
293. See Baumler, supra note 63, at 503 n.213.
294. See supra note 66 for the cases that have addressed the de novo standard of

review.
295. 769 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1985).
296. Id. at 249. In addition, the court made it clear that the de novo standard
applies as well when the government challenges a release order. Id.
297. Id. at 249-50.
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dependent consideration-and any additional evidence presented
before it. 298
De novo review of this type in a multi-district proceeding
would doubtlessly solve the concerns that are addressed by the
court in Melendez-Carrion, as well as the concerns addressed by the
dissent in Evans. The district court in the charging district is the
best forum for review because the de novo review standard allows
for a more complete overall presentation of the pertinent evidence.
E.Relation of Magistrate Judges to Article III Judges

In Evans, the dissent concluded that the special relationship
between the magistrate judge and the district court judge requires
the detention hearing and review to be conducted in one district as
a single package. 299 In support of this position, the dissent cited to
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Raddatz. 3°O
In Raddatz, the SupreIp.e Court stated that "Congress made
clear [in the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act] that
the district court has plenary discretion whether to authorize a mag
istrate to hold an evidentiary hearing and that the magistrate acts
subsidiary to and only in aid of the district court."301 Then, after
author~ation,. "the entire process takes place under the district
court's total control and jurisdiction."302 The dissent in Evans as
serted that Raddatz stands for the proposition that the proper pro
cedure for review is for the appeal to go from the magistrate judge
to the district court judge in the district where the magistrate sits. 303
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited
the Raddatz language in United States v. Gebro as pertinent to the
close relationship between the district court and the magistrate
judge ordering release on bail.304 Although the relevant facts of
Gebro are distinguishable from those of Evans, and the issues
298. Id. at 250.
299. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 1995) (Noonan, J.,
dissenting).
300. Id. (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980». See supra notes
150-51 and accompanying text for the facts and holding of Raddatz.
30l. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681.
302. Id. The dissent in Evans argued that "[t]he phrase 'total control' [used in
Raddatz] suggests, even if it does not absolutely require, the proximity of the magistrate
judge to the district court which is exercising control." Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan,
J., dissenting).
303. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
304. United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 1991). See supra notes
154-56 and accompanying text for the facts and holding of Gebro.
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raised in the cases are different,3°5 the Evans dissent considered
Gebro the "closest precedent" for the Ninth Circuit. 306
The Gebro court also relied on an Eighth Circuit court of ap
peals case, United States v. Maull. 307 In Maull, the Eighth Circuit,
in a situation similar to that in Gebro, held that the district court
did not exceed its authority by conducting sua sponte a detention
hearing and ordering the defendant detained. 308 The court held
that "[w]e ... cannot conclude that the government's failure to re
quest detention before the magistrate, or for that matter at all, con
strains the district court judge."309 The court in Maull determined
that the role of the magistrate judge is a limited one, and that there
is a certain territorial hierarchy to proceedings involving a magis
trate judge and the Article III court. 310
305. The facts of Gebro and Evans differ in that the defendant in Gebro was
arrested in the district of prosecution, thus involving a single district proceeding.
Gebro, 948 F.2d at 1119-20. The facts of Gebro gave rise to an issue of whether the
district court judge could review sua sponte the magistrate judge's order. Id. at 1120.
Conversely, the defendant in Evans was arrested in a non-charging district, giving rise
to an issue of the proper procedure to follow in a multi-district proceeding. Evans, 62
F.3d at 1234-35.
306. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
307. 773 F.2d 1479 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). In Maull, the defendant was in
dicted and arrested in the Eastern District of Missouri. Id. at 1481. A federal magis
trate judge set the defendant's bond at one million dollars. Id. Neither the government
nor the magistrate judge moved for pretrial detention. United States v. Maull, 768 F.2d
211, 212 (8th Cir. 1985). The defendant sought review of the conditions of the bond in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Maull, 773 F.2d at
1481. The district court judge held sua sponte a detention hearing and ordered the
defendant detained. Id.
The defendant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court "exceeded the
scope of its authority because the Bail Reform Act of 1984 does not confer jurisdiction
on the district court to go beyond review of the conditions of a bail bond to consider
whether pretrial detention is appropriate." Id. The appellate court held that the dis
trict court had no authority to conduct a detention hearing and reversed and remanded
the district court's order. Id. On remand, the district court ordered the defendant re
leased on a $500,000 appearance bond secured by $250,000 cash or surety. Maull, 768
F.2d at 211.
The defendant again appealed to the Eighth Circuit for an amendment of the con
ditions of release. Id. The court of appeals remanded the district court's order with
directions. Id. at 212. The Eighth Circuit later granted a rehearing en banc and af
firmed the district court's original order of detention of the defendant. United States v.
Maull, 771 F.2d 506 (8th CiT. 1985) (en banc).
308. Maull, 773 F.2d at 1481.
309. Id. at 1486.
310. See id. The Eighth Circuit stated:
Congressional intent to limit the scope of magistrate authority is reinforced by
the charge of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), which gives the judicial officer upon his own
motion the authority to call a detention hearing where there is a serious risk
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Under the auspices of Raddatz and its progeny, the dissent in
Evans argued that the magistrate judge and Article III courts have
a hierarchical relationship.311 The dissent asserted that this rela
tionship lends support to the conclusion that the proper court to
review the magistrate judge's order of detention or release is the
district court in the arresting district. 312
Raddatz, Gebro, and Maull support the proposition that the
magistrate judge's role is limited by the district court which ap
points the magistrate-but only in the single-district case. 313 There
is nothing to suggest that this "territorial hierarchy" approach is
supported by any of these cases in the multi-district context. The
Evans dissent indicated this by acknowledging that Gebro was the
"closest precedent" to the principal case. 314 It is manifest that in a
single-district situation the district court in the arresting district will
have "control" over the magistrate judge.315 But in the multi-dis
that the defendant will flee. The power to decide must finally reside in the
Article III court.

Id.
311. United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 1995) (Noonan, J.,
dissenting).
312. Id. In Evans, the dissent argued that the logical steps in "territorial appel
late review" start at the level of the federal magistrate judge in the district of arrest. Id.
Review then proceeds to the district court judge in the district in which the magistrate
sits, and then to the appellate court of the circuit in which the magistrate judge and
district court are assembled. Id. The dissent asserted that this is the "normal system of
appellate review," and that this view is consistent with the holdings in Raddatz and
Gebro. Id. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 (1980); United States v.
Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 1991).
313. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681; Gebro, 948 F.2d at 1120; Maull, 773 F.2d at 1486.
Under the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.c. §§ 631-639
(1994), "Congress expanded the role of magistrates under the discretion and direction
of district court judges." Raymond P. Bolanos, Note, Magistrates and Felony Voir Dire:
A Threat to Fundamental Fairness?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 827, 840 (1989). See H.R. REP.
No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6162. See
also J. Anthony Downs, Comment, The Boundaries of Article Ill: Delegation of Final
Decisionmaking Authority to Magistrates, 52 U. On. L. REV. 1032,1032 (1985) ("Con
gress expressly granted magistrates the power, upon deSignation by the district
court ... , to conduct 'any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter' as well as
criminal misdemeanor trials."); Philip M. Pro & Thomas C. Hnatowski, Measured Pro
gress: The Evolution and Administration of the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44
AM. U. L. REv. 1503, 1510 (1995) ("A magistrate judge is a judicial officer of the dis
trict court. The district judges appoint magistrate judges within the district ....").
314. Evans, 62 F.3d at 1240 (Noonan, J., dissenting). The dissent acknowledged
that Gebro was the "closest precedent" because it is substantially factually different and
addresses separate issues than does Evans. See supra note 305 and accompanying text
discussing the distinctions between the two cases.
315. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681 ("entire process takes place under district court's
total control and jurisdiction").
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trict situation, this element of control is not as evident. In United
States v. Zuccaro,316 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in a single district bail amendment situation, held
that the district court had the authority to amend a bail order issued
by the magistrate judge.317 The court partially based its decision on
the desire to avoid the' anomalous results that would arise in a
multi-district situation under Rule 40 of the Federal'Rules of Crimi
nal Procedure. 31B The court stated that when the defendant is re
moved to the charging district pursuant to Rule 40, "it would not
make sense to insist that the government's only recourse in seeking
additional conditions of bail is to apply to the judicial officer who
originally set the conditions."319 The court further stated that "the
category of judicial officers authorized to set the initial conditions
of bail covers a broad range of officials . . .. Congress would not
likely have accorded these officers authority to set conditions of re
lease immune from revision by a district judge."32o This approach
was adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev
enth321 and Eighth Circuits,322 both involving actual multi-district
situations. This line of cases illustrates the limited role of the ar
resting district magistrate judge in the multi-district setting. Addi
tionally, the cases show that the district court in the charging district
has control over the magistrate judge, similar to the control as
sumed by the district court in the arresting district.
Under the "territorial hierarchy" notion suggested by the dis
sent in Evans, one would expect that in all cases the district court
would take over the proceedings conducted by the magistrate judge
in the same district. However, it is quite clear that this is' not so in
the multi-district context for several reasons. First, in the multi-dis
trict context, the court with original jurisdiction over the offense is
the district court in the charging district. 323 Under the language of
316. 645 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981). Zuc
caro involved a magistrate judge and a district judge in the same district. The defend
ant was arrested and brought before a federal magistrate judge who released the
defendant on bond. Id. at 105. The next day the government filed a motion with the
district court to increase the bond, and the district court did so. Id. The defendant
appealed, arguing that under 18 U.S.c. § 3146(e) (repealed 1984) the district court
could not amend the bail. Id. See 18 U.S.c. § 3146(e) (1982) (repealed 1984).
317. Zuccaro,645 F.2d at 105-06.
318. Id. at 106.
319.
320.

Id.
Id.

321. United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886, 889-90 (11th Cir. 1982).
322. United States v. Spilotro, 786 F.2d 808, 813-14 (8th Cir. 1986).
323. See discussion supra part III.B. See also Spilotro, 786 F.2d at 813 ("the mag
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section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act, that is the proper district for
review. 324 Second, under Rule 4O(a) of the Federal Rules of Crimi
nal Procedure, the charging district must take over the case if the
defendant is required to stand trial.325 Finally, venue properly lies
solely in the district in which the crime was committed. 326 These
principles disrupt the "territorial hierarchy" notion and indicate
that in a multi-district proceeding the "control" over the magistrate
judge remains generally with the .district court in the charging
district.
Finally, the de novo review standard accorded to the district
courts in review of the magistrate judge supports the conclusion
that a departure from "territorial hierarchy" would not be problem
atic. In fact, the development in the case law of the many different
intricacies within the de novo standard suggests that this divergence
is preferred. 327 Because the district courts need not be deferential
to the magistrate judge, there is no justification for adherence to the
. rigid notion of "territorial hierarchy."
IV.

RESOLUTION OF THE INTERPRETIVE CONFLICT

To resolve the conflict arising in Evans over the proper inter
pretation of section :"145 of the Bail Reform Act, there must be an
accommodation between the views. Legislative intent in the draft
ing of section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is lacking-it
seems that Congress never even gave consideration to the problems
that may arise in the multi-district context. 328 Congress left it to the
judiciary to determine which is "the court having original jurisdic
tion over the offense" as it is worded in section 3145. 329 The ap
istrate ... of the court which has original jurisdiction over the offense charged [the
district court in the charging district] has the authority to amend conditions of release
previously set in another district by another magistrate"); James, 674 F.2d at 890 (dis
trict judge in charging district "had authority as the court with original jurisdiction over
the case to amend the conditions of appellants' release"); Zuccaro, 645 F.2d at 105
(referring to district court in the charging district as the court with original jurisdiction
over the offense).
324. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), (b) (1994) (government or defendant may file with the
court having original jurisdiction over the offense a motion for revocation of the order
or amendment of the conditions).
325. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a).
326. See discussion supra part I.C.
327. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text discussing the de novo stan
dard of review and its variations.
328. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text discussing the lack of consid
eration by Congress of the problems arising in the multi-district situation.
329. St!e generally 18 V.S.C. § 3145 (1994).
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proach best able to integrate the applicable provisions of the Bail
Reform Act of 1984, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
the United States Constitution into a consistent model for multi
district proceedings is the approach suggested by the majority and
concurrence in Evans. 330 Under that approach, the proper tribunal
to review a magistrate judge's orders in the multi-district context is
the district court in the charging district.
The best way to analyze the conclusions of the majority and
concurring opinions in Evans is to view them in contemplation of
the major concerns involved in the underlying issue, as best re
flected in Melendez-Carrion. 331 The court in Melendez-Carrion
concluded that the district of prosecution was normally the best dis
trict in which to assess the defendant for the purpose of determin
ing detention or release. 332 But the court argued that it is important
to give the defendant the opportunity to "present locally available
evidence pertinent to the issue of pretrial release."333
Following this rationale, the Evans-type situation is analogous
to the Melendez-Carrion-type situation. 334 The Second Circuit de
termined that a defendant in a Melendez-Carrion-type situation can
be protected by being afforded an initial proceeding in which to
obtain evidence that may only be reasonably obtainable in the dis
330. There are many concerns involved in coming to a conclusion regarding the
proper interpretation of § 3145. They include: (1) compliance with the prompt appear
ance requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 40 and 5, see FED. R. CRIM.
P. 40 and 5; (2) concern for providing the defendant prompt review, see FED. R. CRIM.
P. 40(a); United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 1995) (Wallace, c.J., con
curring); (3) concern for providing the defendant access to the decisive information and
evidence, see United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir. 1986); (4)
determining the proper court to handle a personal, knowledgeable assessment of the
defendant, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1994); Evans, 62 F.3d at 1238 (Wallace, c.J., con
curring); Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990; United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702,
704-05 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Velasco, 879 F. Supp. 377, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
United States v. Johnson, 858 F. Supp. 119, 122 (N.D. Ind. 1994); United States v. Jones,
804 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (S.D. Ind. 1992); United States v. Acheson, 672 F. Supp. 577,
579 (D.N.H. 1987); (5) compliance with constitutional rights, see U.S. CONST. art III,
§ 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; and (6) consistency among statutory sections, Federal
Rules, and the Constitution.
331. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. See supra notes 276-92 and accompany
ing text discussing Melendez-Carrion.
332. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990.
333. Id.
334. Recall that Evans involved a determination of the proper court to review the
order of the magistrate. See Evans, 62 F.3d at 1234. In Melendez-Carrion, the situation
involved a question of whether removal proceedings should precede the detention hear
ing. See Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. The cases are analogous, however, in that
both involve the underlying concern of determining which court is best able to assess
the defendant under § 3142 of the Bail Reform Act.
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trict of arrest. 335 Although Melendez-Carrion is distinguishable
from Evans in that it would afford protection in a removal proceed
ing rather than a review proceeding, the underlying purpose-to
give the defendant the opportunity to obtain critical evidence or
information in the district of residence-applies equally in the Ev
ans context.
Thus, the concern in interpreting section 3145 to afford the de
fendant protection from inaccessibility to local evidence in the Ev
ans-type situation is allayed. 336 The defendant in Evans had
already been given the opportunity to present the local evidence
because the detention hearing actually took place in the district of
arrest. 337 That is analogous to affording the defendant in a
Melendez-Carrion-type situation an opportunity to present the lo
cal evidence in a proceeding prior to removal.
Moreover, this approach promotes consistency between the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 and the underlying purposes of the con
stitutional guarantee of trial in the district wherein the crime is
alleged to have been committed. 338 The hallmark of the constitu
tional venue provisions is the facilitation of factfinding. 339 Author
izing de novo review in the district court in the charging district
advances this objective.
CONCLUSION

The arguments supporting the "district of prosecution" per
spective have a strong foundation in the case law and are bolstered
by viewing them in light of various sections of the Bail Reform Act
of 1984. Moreover, this view reads consistently with Rule 40 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the United States Consti
tution. In view of this persuasive support, it is most reasonable to
interpret section 3145 of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 as requiring
review of the magistrate judge's order of detention or release in the
district court in which prosecution is pending.
335. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 990. This initial proceeding to which the
Melendez-Carrion court refers is not a detention hearing. It is a proceeding designed to
give the defendant an opportunity to present the local evidence to the magistrate judge
in the local district. See id. The purpose of the local proceeding is "so that a transcript
of such .evidence can be prepared and furnished to the [magistrate judge] making the
detention decision in the district of prosecution." Id.
336. See Evans, 62 F.3d at 1239 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 1234-35.
338. See discussion supra part I.e.
339. Note, supra note 72, at 107-08. See supra note 73.
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A plain reading of section 3145 in light of the influence of Arti
cle III, Section 2, Clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution supports this interpretation. In the phrase "the
court having original jurisdiction over the offense," the word "the"
is important in limiting the court with "original jurisdiction" to a
particular court.340 And an analysis of Article III, Section 2, Clause
3 and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution reveals that a de
fendant is afforded a constitutional right to be tried in the district
where the crimes are alleged to have been committed.341
Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also fac
tors into the inquiry. Absent a waiver, the defendant will be re
quired, under Rule 40(a), to stand trial in the prosecuting district. 342
Moreover, under Rule 40(c), papers generated in the pretrial deten
tion proceedings and any bail collected in the district of arrest are
required to be transferred to the charging district upon a determi
nation of detention or release, properly contemplating removal to
that district. 343
Finally, the factors that the magistrate judge must consider in
making the determination of detention or release are best reas
sessed on review by the district court in: the district of prosecu
tion. 344 The charging district will normally have the requisite
familiarity with the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged. 345 Any concerns regarding inaccessibility to local evi
dence are alleviated by the flexibility of the de novo review
standard.
Because the functions and objectives of the Bail Reform Act
overlap with other important authorities, primarily the United
States Constitution and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
development of consistency among these authorities is crucial. The
reasons for the development of consistency are threefold: (1) to
protect the rights of the accused; (2) to preserve the safety of the
community; and (3) to promote the expediency of the criminal pro
cess. By concluding that the authority to review a federal magis
trate judge's order, pursuant to section 3145 of the Bail Reform
340. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (1994) (emphasis added).
341. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cI. 3 ("1i"ial shall be held in the State where the
... Crimes shall have been committed"); U.S. CONST. amend VI ("right to ... trial[ ] by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed").
.
342. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(a).
343. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4O(c).
344. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1994).
345. § 3142(g)(1).
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Act, lies solely with the charging district, the Evans court fomlU
lated a logical and consistent model of criminal pretrial proce
dure-indeed, an apropos solution to the question of the proper
interpretation of section 3145. As the framework of this Note dem
onstrates, adherence to,the notion of criminal pretrial consistency
among the relevant authorities in fact ultimately dictates such a
conclusion.
Scott C. Wells

